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COMMENT
DUE PROCESS FOR ALL? DUE PROCESS,
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND
NAZI WAR CRIMINALS*
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 7, 1987, Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall
blocked the deportation of alleged Nazi war criminal Karl Linnas to
consider, one final time, whether the United States should deport
Linnas to the Soviet Union, where a Soviet court had sentenced him
to death in absentia.' Linnas stood accused of participating in Nazi
atrocities as head of the Nazi Concentration Camp at Tartu, Estonia
during World War 11.2 A New York Federal District Court revoked
Linnas' citizenship in 1981, after the United States brought a denat-
uralization action against him.3 After finding Linnas deportable
under United States immigration laws, an Administrative LawJudge
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service set Linnas' deporta-
* The author would like to thank Professor Steven Lubet, Kathleen Murray, Barbara
Whisler and Francis Kuplicki for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
1 LI Man Wins Delay of Deportation Order, N.Y. Times, April 3, 1987, at B24, col. 1.
Linnas had applied to Justice Marshall for a stay of deportation. Justices Brennan,
Blackmun, and O'Connor would have granted the application for the stay. Linnas v.
I.N.S., 107 S. Ct. 1882 (1987). The Court had originally denied certiorari in Linnas v.
I.N.S., 479 U.S. 995 (1986). Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and O'Connor would have
granted certiorari. Rehearing was denied in Linnas v. I.N.S., 479 U.S. 1070 (1987).
2 See, e.g., Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d 1024, 1026 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
995 (1986), reh'g denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987). The Circuit Court of Appeals called the
evidence against Linnas "overwhelming and largely uncontroverted." Id. Several arti-
cles, however, appeared in the New York Times in support of blocking Linnas' deporta-
tion. Attorney General Edwin Meese was sympathetic to Linnas' case. See Noble, Meese
Gives Nazi Suspect Time to Find a Country, N.Y. Times, March 6, 1987, at A32, col. 1. For-
mer Reagan White House aide Patrick Buchanan expressed his objections to the depor-
tation of Linnas. Buchanan, Get It Out In the Open, N.Y. Times, April 7, 1987, at A34, col.
5 (op ed.). Also, ethnic organizations of Baltic and Ukrainian emigrants in the United
States lobbied against his deportation. Meese Hears Plea in Nazi Case, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14,
1987, at A50, col. 3.
3 United States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. 426, 428 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), af'd, 685 F.2d
427 (2d Cir. 1982).
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tion for the Soviet Union.4 The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed this decision, 5 and the United States deported Lin-
nas to the Soviet Union. He died there on July 2, 1987.6 Looking
at the eighth amendment 7 and the constitutional right to due pro-
cess of law,8 Linnas' case raises serious questions about the denatu-
ralization and deportation process which may have resulted in his
death.
As a problem of eighth amendment analysis, Linnas' case impli-
cates the cruel and unusual punishment clause. The eighth amend-
ment forbids "cruel and unusual punishment" 9 in a criminal
context.' 0 Although Linnas' case was not criminal, it arguably had
criminal implications due to the link between his denaturalization,
deportation and Nazi atrocities." Linnas' deportation resulted, in
part, due to his misrepresentations on his entry forms regarding his
Nazi affiliations. 12 Because of his Soviet death sentence, Linnas
faced the punishment of death either for misrepresentations on
forms, which may violate the eighth amendment,'3 or for his partici-
pation in murder, which, though it does not violate the eighth
amendment, requires a criminal trial satisfying fifth amendment
guarantees of due process of law.14
As a problem of due process, the Linnas case is, perhaps, a
worst case scenario envisioned by a clever constitutional law profes-
sor. 15 Here was a man convicted in the Soviet Union in absentia for
4 Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d at 1027.
5 Id. at 1032.
6 Keller, Estonian Sent to Face Death in Soviet Dies in Hospital, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1987,
at A2, col. 3. Linnas died due to natural causes. According to Linnas' daughter, the
Soviet Union commuted Linnas' sentence prior to his death. The author, however,
could not find public announcement of this by the Soviet Union. Linnas Death Sentence
Reportedly Commuted, N.Y. Times, July 5, 1987, at A18, col. 5.
7 The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII.
8 The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o person
shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. U.S.
CONST. amend. V. For the full text of the fifth amendment, see infra note 33.
9 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
10 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977).
11 See infra notes 171-79 and accompanying text.
12 Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d 1024, 1026 (2d Cir. 1986).
13 See infra notes 171-78 and accompanying text.
14 See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
15 Other alleged Nazi war criminals who have undergone similar denaturalization
and deportation proceedings include: Vladimir Sokolov, a Russian who allegedly wrote
for an anti-Semetic German propaganda paper entitled Rech, United States v. Sokolov,
814 F.2d 864, 867 (2d Cir. 1987); Liudas Kairys, an alleged guard at the concentration
camp at Treblinka, Poland, United States v. Kairys, 600 F. Supp. 1254, 1256 (N.D. Ill.
1984); Serge Kowalchuk, a member of the Ukrainian militia in Lubomyl, Poland, United
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his war crimes.' 6 Most Americans concerned about the constitu-
tional rights of individuals to defend themselves against criminal
charges would find this problematic.17 The deportation of Linnas to
the Soviet Union, after conviction in that country in absentia, gave
him no opportunity to defend himself. Also, because no extradition
treaty' 8 exists between the United States and the Soviet Union the
United States may have, in effect, extradited Linnas in the absence
of such a treaty. 19 Soviet criminal process varies so greatly from the
American scheme ensuring due process that it cannot be considered
analogous. 20 Thus, the questions concerning Linnas' right to due
process are compelling and must be explored.
Further, evidentiary problems also arise in Nazi war crimes
cases. The photographic displays used may be highly suggestive. 2 1
"[T]he prosecution of persons for crimes committed as many as
forty years in the past cannot help but raise serious, and perhaps
States v. Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d 488, 490 (3d Cir. 1985); and Feodor Fedorenko, an al-
leged guard at Treblinka. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 493 (1981).
16 Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d at 1027. The case of Feodor Fedorenko was similar.
The United States deported Fedorenko to the Soviet Union for his alleged war crimes.
In the Soviet Union, Fedorenko was tried, convicted and, executed. N.Y. TimesJuly 28,
1987, at A3, col. 5.
17 The Soviet legal system does not provide the same protections for the criminal
defendant as does the American system. As one study noted:
mhe arrested person [in the Soviet system] ... in the most serious cases, while he
is confined, may not receive visitors or send or receive letters or telephone calls
during confinement. It is, therefore, quite impossible for him to arrange for a legal
defense, or have legal assistance, while the investigation within the nine-month limit
continues.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, A CONTRAST BETWEEN THE LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED
STATES AND IN THE SOVIET UNION 162 (1968).
18 The Supreme Court has defined extradition as "the surrender by one nation to
another of an individual accused or convicted of an offence [sic] outside of its own terri-
tory, and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to try
and to punish him, demands the surrender." Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289
(1902). Under United States laws of extradition, a request for extradition may be
granted only pursuant to a treaty of extradition between the United States and the re-
questing country. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181 & 3184 (1985). Therefore, the absence of an extra-
dition treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States renders extradition
impossible from the United States to the Soviet Union.
19 Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d at 1030-31.
20 The Soviet and American systems of criminal law differ fundamentally. The So-
viet criminal law system is based on the Romanist legal tradition, whereas the United
States is based on the English common law. In keeping with the Romanist tradition, the
Soviet system employs a "preliminary investigator" who conducts a thorough investiga-
tion into the facts. The Soviets conduct this investigation in secret. The investigation is
like a preliminary trial, except that the accused is not represented by counsel at this
time. See, e.g. ,J. HAZARD, W. BUTLER, & P. MAGGS, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM: THE LAw
IN THE 1980's 56 (1984).
21 See infra notes 288-311 and accompanying text.
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unique, questions of procedural due process." 22 The evidence is
stale, for the witnesses are elderly and have memory problems. 23
Also, finding additional evidence of crimes committed so far in the
past is decidedly difficult.24 There are also difficulties due to the
source of much of the evidence: the Soviet Union. The Soviets are
notorious for falsifying such evidence. 25 Thus, it is important to ex-
amine closely the evidence used in such cases, for it may imply fur-
ther due process problems.
The United States proved by "clear, unequivocal and convinc-
ing evidence" that Linnas lied on his entry papers about his parti-
cipation in heinous crimes throughout the Holocaust. 26 The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit found the evidence against him
overwhelming.27 Eyewitnesses testified that Linnas ordered the
transportation of Jewish women and children to a ditch outside the
Tartu camp, where they were shot as they knelt alongside the
edge.28 The ditch became a mass grave. 29 If Linnas ordered such
atrocities, he had escaped punishment for them in the United States
far too long. The United States system of criminal justice affords a
means to convict and punish individuals guilty of crimes such as
those of Linnas. Thus, it is possible that a heinous murderer es-
caped his justly deserved fate for thirty-five years, only to die of nat-
ural causes in the Soviet Union.30
The Linnas case, however, is not a hypothetical. Rather, it was
a real case, presenting very real issues. These issues do not end
with Linnas' death. The Office of Special Investigations 3 I is cur-
rently investigating twelve other individuals whom the United States
22 Nesselson and Lubet, Eyewitness Idntification in War Crimes Trials, 2 CARDOZO L.
REV. 71 (1980).
23 Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. 386, 390 (1868). The court in Riddles-
barger described aspects of stale claims as those that are difficult to maintain because of
lost evidence, death of a witness, the imperfect recollection of remaining witnesses, or
the destruction of documents, making it impossible to establish the truth. Id.
24 Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d at 1026.
25 See infra notes 312-35 and accompanying text.
26 United States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. 438-39.
27 Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d at 1026.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Keller, Estonian Sent to Face Death in Soviet Dies in a Hospital, N.Y. Times, July 3,
1987, at A2, col. 3.
31 The Office of Special Investigations is part of the United States Department of
Justice. The responsibilities of the Office are the detection and identification of Nazi war
criminals as well as the commencement of appropriate legal action leading to the denat-
uralization and/or deportation of former Nazis in the United States. OFFICE OF THE
FEDERAL REGISTER, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1988/89 375 (1988).
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may denaturalize and deport to the Soviet Union.32 Linnas' case
must be examined in light of the eighth amendment and the right to
due process guaranteed by the fifth amendment, 33 or it is possible
that other alleged 34 Nazi war criminals might face denaturalization
and deportation without adequate protection of their rights. Fur-
ther, a solution to this problem may also ensure that actual Nazi war
criminals will not escape justice in the United States.
This Comment explores the constitutional arguments against
the denaturalization and deportation process as that process is ap-
plied to alleged Nazi war criminals. This Comment concludes that
the current denaturalization and deportation process may violate
the eighth amendment and the Due Process Clause of the fifth
amendment by depriving individuals such as Linnas of their lives
and liberty without a fair criminal trial, often through the use of de-
cidedly problematic evidence. After detailing the due process
problems of the current system, this Comment proposes a solution,
calling for the trial of alleged Nazi war criminals in the United
States, where the American criminal system will ensure the safe-
guarding of their rights under United States laws.
32 Noble, 12 With Nazi Ties Facing Deportation, N.Y. Times, April 24, 1987, at A6, col.
4.
33 The fifth amendment provides that:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a GrandJury, except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of war or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
34 The word "alleged" is used throughout this Comment because the United States
has not proven in a crminal court that the defendants in denaturalization and deporta-
tion cases are guilty of criminal conduct "beyond a reasonable doubt." Under United
States constitutional criminal procedure, criminal defendants are afforded a trial by a
jury of their peers, in which the government must show guilt by "proof beyond a reason-
able doubt." In denaturalization proceedings, by contrast, one is not tried for his or her
crimes, but instead on whether he or she has lied on either the application for admission
to the country or the application for naturalization. The standard of proof is "clear,
unequivocal, and convincing" evidence. Maxwell Land Grant Case, 121 U.S. 325, 381
(1887). Also, there is no right of trial by jury in denaturalization proceedings, Luria v.
United States, 231 U.S. 9, 27-28 (1913), or in deportation proceedings, Johannessen v.
United States, 225 U.S. 227, 237-39 (1912). The right to trial byjury in criminal cases is
guaranteed in the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. It is also guaran-
teed in "[s]uits at common law." U.S. CONsT. amend. VII. Nesselson and Lubet advo-
cate pre-trial motions in denaturalization and deportation proceedings as a means of
ensuring that any evidence admitted is reliable. See Nesselson & Lubet, supra note 22 at
79-80.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. THE "DISPLACED PERSONS ACT"
To understand how the denaturalization and deportation
processes function with regard to alleged Nazi war criminals, it is
necessary to understand how such individuals first entered the
United States. Karl Linnas, and others like him, 35 entered the
United States under the the Displaced Persons Act ("DPA").36 The
DPA was enacted in 1948 and allowed European refugees of World
War II to gain admission to the United States despite traditional
immigration quotas.37 The DPA allowed individuals displaced from
their native lands during World War II to find a haven in the United
States, because these individuals could not "return to any of such
countries because of persecution or fear of persecution on account
of race, religion or political opinions." 38 The DPA excluded those
who persecuted civilians. 39 If an individual made misrepresenta-
tions on his or her admission application for the United States which
were discovered prior to admission, he or she could not enter.
40
An official of the International Refugee Organization ("IRO")4 1
initially determined whether each person seeking admission to the
United States qualified as a displaced person.42 After this determi-
35 The OSI currently has twelve individuals under investigation. Noble, 12 With Nazi
Ties Facing Deportation, N.Y. Times, April 24, 1987, at A6, col. 4.
36 Displaced Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948), amended by Pub.
L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219 (1950).
37 62 Stat. 1010; Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 495. The United States gave individuals from
the Baltic states an immigration preference. 40% of the visas, by law, had to go to Baltic
nationals. "The reason for that preference ostensibly was that the Soviet Union had
occupied those countries and we did not recognize that occupation." A. Ryan, Responses
to World War Two War Criminals and Human Rights Violators: National and Comparative Per-
spectives, 8 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 3, 18 (1988)(symposium).
38 Displaced Persons Act, 62 Stat. 10 11. Such individuals still had to qualify for ad-
mission under other immigration laws of the United States, however. 62 Stat. 1009-
1014 (1948).
39 Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 495 (quoting IRO Constitution). The IRO Constitution ex-
cluded the following individuals:
1. War criminals, quislings and traitors.
2. Any other persons who can be shown:
(a) to have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of countries, Mem-
bers of the United Nations; or
(b) to have voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the outbreak of the second
world war in their operations against the United Nations.
Annex 1, Part II, 62 Stat. 3051-52. This definition was incorporated into the DPA. See id.
at § 2(b), 62 Stat. 1009.
40 Displaced Persons Act, 62 Stat. 1013.
41 62 Stat. 3037, 3051 (1946).
42 Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 495.
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nation, an official of the Displaced Persons Commission 43 inter-
viewed the applicant to decide whether he or she was eligible under
the DPA.44 A vice consul from the State Department would then
make a decision on the given applicant.45 Finally, the Immigration
and Naturalization Service ("INS") made certain, through reviewing
the case, that the individual was admissible under United States im-
migration laws.46 Once the individual passed these requirements, as
Linnas did in 1951, the United States considered the person eligible
for admission into the United States.
In the course of gaining legal admission to the United States, an
individual must fill out forms listing past crimes, convictions, and
organizations with which the individual was involved.47 Under the
DPA, the United States conducted a thorough investigation into the
applicant's background as well as questioned the applicant prior to
granting admission.48 Thus, pursuant to the DPA, Linnas had to
sign a sworn statement prior to receiving his immigration visa.49
B. THE NATURALIZATION AND DENATURALIZATION PROCESS
In order to become a citizen of the United States, a person must
gain lawful admission into the United States as a permanent resi-
dent. 50 The DPA offered individuals displaced during World War II
an immediate means of gaining such admission. 51 Individuals who
lied in order to gain admission took a slot that could have gone to a
43 The Displaced Persons Act, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948), created the Displaced Persons
Commission to:
make provisions for necessary supplies, facilities, and services to carry out the provi-
sions and accomplish the purposes of this Act. It should be the duty of the Commis-
sion to formulate and issue regulations, necessary under the provisions of this Act,
and in compliance therewith, for the admission into the United States of eligible
displaced orphans and eligible displaced persons.
Id. at 1012.
44 Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 495-6.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 496. Other immigration laws existed at the time that could exclude an indi-
vidual from the United States. Section 5 of the DPA provided that such individuals
should still be excluded even if they qualified as displaced persons. 62 Stat. 1011.
United States immigration law also established different quotas. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a)
(1982).
47 See Nesselson & Lubet, supra note 22, at 72-73. This requirement is found in Im-
migration and Naturalization Service Form 1-485, Application for Status as Permanent
Resident (rev. May 5, 1983).
48 62 Stat. 1013 (1948).
49 United States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. 426, 437 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). Linnas also had
to sign INS form 1-144, in which he swore he had "never advocated or assisted in the
persecution of any person because of race, religion or national origin." Id. at 438
50 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (1982).




true victim. Once an individual gained admission into the United
States under the DPA, he or she had the opportunity to become a
naturalized citizen of the United States after living continuously
here for five years, and exhibiting "good moral character" during
that period.52 In an application for naturalization, 53 the applicant
must fill out another form disclosing, once again under oath, past
criminal activities, organizational affiliations, and military service.
54
Linnas filled out a similar form in order to gain United States citi-
zenship. 55 The government also interviewed him under oath and
questioned him extensively about his past. 56 Taking advantage of
this procedure, Karl Linnas became a naturalized citizen in February
of 1960.
57
The United States can denaturalize a naturalized citizen on sev-
eral grounds. 58 The grounds for denaturalization usually applied to
Nazi war criminals are that the "certificate of naturalization [was]...
illegally procured or [was]... procured by concealment of a material
fact or a willful misrepresentation.- 59 Congress, aware of the pres-
ence of Nazi war criminals in the United States, in 197860 enacted
the Holtzman Amendment 6 ' to relieve the problem. Congress spe-
52 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1982). "Naturalization" is defined as "the conferring of na-
tionality of a state upon a person after birth, by any means whatsoever." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a) (23) (1982). A naturalized citizen is an individual who, though previously a
citizen of another state, has United States citizenship conferred upon him or her. Some-
times the individual must renounce his or her foreign citizenship to obtain United States
citizenship.
53 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1982).
54 Immigration and Naturalization Service Form N-400, Application to File Petition
for Naturalization (rev. May 5, 1983).
55 Linnas filed his petition on July 4, 1959. He then was interviewed under oath,
during which his past was extensively discussed and forms were prepared. United States
v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. 426 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
56 Id.
57 Id. at 428.
58 After an individual gives immigration officials this information, a judge may deny
an individual citizenship on several grounds. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182 (1970 & Supp. 1989).
Several categories may be applicable to war criminals. One of them is a more general
provision, providing that "[a]liens who have been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude.. ., or aliens who admit having committed such a crime, or aliens who admit
committing acts which constitute the essential elements of such a crime" should be de-
nied admission to the United States. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(9) (1970 & Supp. 1989).
Most alleged criminals trying to gain admittance to the United States do not admit their
crimes. Thus, the United States could not use this section in cases such as that of Lin-
nas, in which he did not confess to crimes.
59 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1982).
60 92 Stat. 2065 (1978).
61 The term "Holtzman Amendment" refers to five sections of the United States
code: 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(33); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3); 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(19); 8 U.S.C.




cifically aimed the legislation at Nazi war criminals to ensure that
none would find a haven from their crimes in the United States.
62
The Holtzman Amendment, in part, provides for the deportation of
any alien who, during World War II, in association with the Nazi
government of Germany, "ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise
participated in the persecution of any person because of race, reli-
gion, national origin, or political opinion." 63 It made ex-Nazis ineli-
gible for visas, 64 and eliminated the attorney general's ability to
admit them as temporary nonimmigrants. 65 It also removed an ex-
Nazi's ability to voluntarily depart from the United States.
66
Unlike other deportable aliens, individuals falling under this
legislation cannot have their deportation blocked by the Attorney
General of the United States. 67 The type of persecution the alien
might face in the nation to which he or she is deported is irrele-
vant. 68 Unlike other aliens, who may depart voluntarily, 69 alleged
Nazis may not since the enactment of the Holtzman Amendment.
70
Without these misrepresentations, they would not be eligible for ad-
mission or naturalization. These lies carried over to the naturaliza-
62 Representative Elizabeth Holtzman of New York sponsored the Amendment, and
stated during the debates on it:
Mr. Speaker, the presence of Nazi war criminals in the United States constitutes the
unfinished business of World War II. By taking a forthright stand against allowing
these mass murderers a haven in this country, we will not only reaffirm our commit-
ment to human rights but we will be making it clear that persecution in any form is
repugnant to democracy and to our way of life.
124 CONG. REC. H31647 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1978)(statements of Rep. Holtzman).
63 The Holtzman Amendment provides, in part, that anyone:
under the direction of, or in association with-
(A) the Nazi government of Germany,
(B) any government in any area occupied by the military forces of the Nazi govern-
ment of Germany,
(C) any government established with the assistance or cooperation of the Nazi
government of Germany, or
(D) any government which was an ally of the Nazi government of Germany, or-
dered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person
because of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion.
8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(19) (1982).
64 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(33) (1982).
65 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3) (1982).
66 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1982).
67 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982). The Attorney General can withhold deportation if he
or she "determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1982). A specific exception exists for Nazi
war criminals under the Holtzman Amendment. See infra note 105 for the text of the
Holtzman Amendment.
68 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1982).
69 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1982).
70 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e) (1970)(Supp. 1988).
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tion forms. 71 Lying on the forms, however, led to denaturalization
and possibly to deportation under the Immigration and Nationality
Act. 72 The United States must prove by "clear, uneqivocal and con-
vincing evidence" 78 that the defendant concealed a material fact or
made a willful misrepresentation on these forms.
The United States attorney for a given district has a duty to
bring denaturalization proceedings "upon affidavit showing good
cause." 74 The United States attorney brings these proceedings in
federal district court.75 If the United States can prove by "clear,
unequivocal, and convincing" evidence 76 that the individual falsified
material information on either the entry forms or the naturalization
forms, 77 it can subject him or her to denaturalization and deporta-
tion proceedings.
Linnas' denaturalization occurred, in part, because he made
"willful, material misrepresentations" on his entry forms.78 Prior to
denaturalization, the government must show that such misrepresen-
tations are material. In Chaunt v. United States,79 the Supreme Court
interpreted the term "material" as used in § 1451(a) denaturaliza-
tion proceedings. In Chaunt, the United States attempted to denatu-
ralize a native of Hungary.8 0 The United States alleged that Chaunt
had falsely denied his membership in the Communist Party and had
misrepresented his arrest record on his naturalization forms. 8' The
Court found that the naturalization officials could infer Chaunt's
communist affiliation from his admission that he was a member of
the International Workers' Order, a group controlled by the Com-
munist Party.82 The Court concluded that, although arrests are sig-
71 See infra note 77.
72 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1982).
73 Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943).
74 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1982).
75 8 U.S.C. § 1421(a) (1982).
76 Maxwell Land Grant Case, 121 U.S. 325, 381 (1887). See also Schneiderman, 320
U.S. at 125 (1943) (invoking clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence standard for use
in denaturalization case); Woodby v. I.N.S., 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966)(invoking clear,
unequivocal and convincing evidence standard for use in deportation case).
77 If the entry form contains false information, the naturalization form will inevitably
have the same false information.
78 The District Court also found that Linnas lacked the requisite moral character for
naturalization required under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1427(a)(3) (1982), due to his involvement with the Nazis. See United States v. Linnas,
527 F. Supp. 426, 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
79 364 U.S. 350 (1960).
80 Id. at 350.
81 Id. at 351.
82 Id. at 355.
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nificant and therefore "material" in naturalization proceedings,83
the United States had "failed to show by 'clear, unequivocal, and
convincing evidence' either (1) that facts were suppressed which, if
known, would have warranted denial of citizenship or (2) that their
disclosure might have been useful in an investigation possibly lead-
ing to the discovery of other facts warranting denial of citizen-
ship."'84 Courts apply this analysis, known as the materiality
standard, to cases in which individuals had lied or withheld informa-
tion on their naturalization papers.8 5 The Supreme Court has not
yet applied the materiality standard to admission documents.
86
The Court has recently explained the materiality standard in
Kungys v. United States.8 7 In Kungys, the Court considered the case of
a Lithuanian man who misrepresented the date and place of his
birth on his visa and naturalization papers. 88 In evaluating the ma-
teriality of such misrepresentations under § 1451 (a) of the INA, the
Court began by noting that the misrepresentations must be both
"willful and material." 89 The Court explained the test as:
[W]hether the misrepresentation or concealment was predictably ca-
pable of affecting, i.e., had a natural tendency to affect, the official de-
cision. The official decision in question, of course, is whether the
applicant meets the requirements for citizenship, so that the test more
specifically is whether the misrepresentation or concealment had a nat-
ural tendency to produce the conclusion that the applicant was quali-
fied. This test must be met, of course, by evidence that is clear,
unequivocal, and convincing.90
Justice Scalia stated that misrepresentations as to the date and place
of Kungys' birth were not material.9 1
In Linnas' case, the Court would have found his misrepresenta-
tions as to his part in Nazi atrocities material. Thus, Linnas' alleged
83 Id. at 354.
84 Id. at 355. One year later in Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961), the
Court applied the materiality standard to a bootlegger who stated his business was real
estate on his naturalization papers. The Court held that the "[s]uppressed or concealed
facts ... if known, might in and of themselves justify denial of citizenship.'" Id. at 272
(quoting Chaunt, 364 U.S. at 352-53).
85 Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 509 (1981); United States v. Kungys,
793 F.2d 516, 529 (3d Cir. 1986), rev'd, Kungys v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1537 (1988).
86 Chaunt, 364 U.S. at 355. In Kungys v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1537 (1988), vari-
ous members of the Court disagreed on this point. Justice Scalia, writing for the major-
ity, stated that the materiality standard was limited to naturalization documents and did
not apply to entry documents. Id. at 1548 (Scalia, J.). Justice White disagreed with this
contention. Id. at 1565-66 (White, J., dissenting).
87 108 S. Ct. 1537 (1988). The Court decided Kungys too late for the Linnas case.
88 Id. at 1543.
89 Id. at 1544.
90 Id. at 1547.
91 Id. at 1548 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
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position as head of a concentration camp would have undoubtedly
barred his admission and naturalization had it surfaced during the
DPA process. It is material under the Kungys standard. Likewise,
under the Chaunt standard, which was applicable at the time of Lin-
nas' denaturalization and deportation, Linnas' misrepresentations,
if proven by "clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence," would
be material.
Once the United States denaturalizes an individual, the govern-
ment may find him or her deportable. Under the Holtzman Amend-
ment, the United States must bring deportation proceedings against
those involved with the army of Nazi Germany.92 A "special inquiry
officer" of the Immigration and Naturalization Service conducts the
deportation proceedings. 93 After this officer conducts the adminis-
trative deportation hearing, he or she may order deportation if such
a decision is supported by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evi-
dence. ' '94 Once the officer orders deportation, the alien may appeal
to the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the
administrative proceeding occurred. 95 The court then decides the
case based upon the administrative record and the Attorney Gen-
eral's findings of fact.96 If such evidence is "clear, unequivocal and
convincing,"'97 the court will sustain the deportation order.98
C. THE LINNAS CASE
The United States brought an action in a New York district
court in 1979 to revoke the citizenship of Karl Linnas. 99 Linnas en-
tered the United States in 1951100 under the Displaced Persons Act
of 1948.101 A New York Supreme Court admitted Linnas to citizen-
92 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(19) (1982).
93 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1982). The special inquiry officers must "administer oaths,
present and receive evidence, interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien or wit-
nesses, and, as authorized by the Attorney General, shall make determinations, includ-
ing orders of deportation." Id.
94 Woodby v. Immigration Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966). The United States code
provides for "reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)
(1982). However, finding deportation similar in effect to denaturalization, the Court in
Woodby extended the denaturalization standard of "clear, unequivocal and convincing
evidence" to deportation cases. Woodby, 385 U.S. at 286.
95 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(2) (1982).
96 8 U.S.C. § llO5a(a)(4) (1982).
97 Woodby, 385 U.S. at 286. See also supra note 94 (describing code versus case law
standards).
98 Id.; U.S.C. § 1252 (b)b(4) (1982).
99 United States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. at 428.
100 Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d at 1026.
101 Under the Displaced Person Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 1009-14, the definition of a dis-
placed person was adopted from the International Refugee Organization ("IRO") Con-
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ship.10 2 Linnas had told the Army Counter Intelligence Corps that
he had been a university student from 1940 to 1943.103 He signed a
sworn statement in May of 1951 stating he had "never advocated or
assisted in the persecution of any person because of race, religion or
national origin."10 4 The Government relied on the Holtzman
Amendment' 05 to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
stitution. The IRO was a creation of the United Nations. Its purpose was to place
individuals uprooted during World War II. The IRO Constitution, signed by the United
States on December 16, 1946, provided that the IRO would not help any person who
had "assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of countries, Members of the
United Nations." See 62 Stat. 3037, 3051 (1946) for relevant portions of the IRO Con-
stitution. A displaced person was any individual forced to leave his or her country by the
Nazi government of Germany, whether for racial, religious, or political reasons. Id. at
3050. Under this definition, those who aided the Nazi government of Germany in the
persecution of civilians were not admissible to the United States.
102 United States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. at 428.
103 Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d at 1026.
104 Id.
105 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1982). The Holtzman Amendment provides the following:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the following classes of aliens shall be
ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into the United
States: .... (33) Any alien who during the period beginning on March 23, 1933, and
ending on May 8, 1945, under the direction of, or in association with -...
(A) the Nazi government in Germany,
(B) any government in any area occupied by the military forces of the Nazi govern-
ment of Germany,
(C) any government established with the assistance or cooperation of the Nazi
government of Germany,
(D) any government which was an ally of the Nazi government of Germany, or-
dered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person
because of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(33) (1982).
Except as provided in this subsection, an alien (A) who is applying for a nonimmi-
grant visa and is known or believed by the consular officer to be ineligible for such
visa under one or more of the paragraphs enumerated in subsection (a) of this sec-
tion (other than paragraphs (27), (29), and (33)), may, after approval by the Attor-
ney General of a recommendation by the Secretary of State or by the consular
officer that the alien be admitted temporarily despite his inadmissibility, be granted
such a visa and may be admitted into the United States temporarily despite his inad-
missibility, be granted such a visa and may be admitted into the United States tem-
porarily as a nonimmmigrant in the discretion of the Attorney General, or (B) who
is inadmissible under one or more of the paragraphs enumerated in subsection (a)
of this section (other than paragraphs (27), (29), and (33)), but who is in possession
of appropriate documents or is granted a waiver thereof and is seeking admission,
may be admitted into the United States temporarily as a nonimmigrant in the discre-
tion of the Attorney General.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3) (1982).
Deportable aliens-general classes
(a) Any alien in the United States (including an alien crewman) shall, upon the
order of the Attorney General, be deported who -..
(19) during the period beginning on March 23, 1933, and ending on May 8, 1945,
under the direction of, or in association with-
(A) the Nazi government of Germany,




claiming Linnas' citizenship was (1) illegally procured and (2) pro-
cured by concealment of a material fact or willful misrepresenta-
tion.' 0 6  Such misrepresentations or concealments lead to
denaturalization proceedings.' 07
The Government sought to establish that Linnas was a member
of the Selbstschutz, a group of native Estonians who aided the Ger-
man military forces in Estonia beginning in the summer of 1941,108
while Linnas claimed he was a university student in Tartu during
1940-1943.109 At trial, an expert on the Holocaust, Professor Hil-
berg, testified that the Selbstschutz aided mobile Nazi killing units
known as "Einsatzkommandos" in making the Tartu area of Estonia
(C) any government established with the assistance or cooperation of the Nazi
government of Germany, or
(D) any government which was an ally of the Nazi government of Germany, or-
dered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person
because of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion.
8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(19) (1982).
(h) Withholding of deportation or return
(1) The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien (other than an alien
described in section 1251(a)(19) of this title) to a country if the Attorney General
determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any alien if the Attorney General determines
that -
(A) the alien, ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecu-
tion of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a partic-
ular social group, or political opinion;
(B) the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious
crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the United States;
(C) there are serious reasons for considering that the alien has committed a seri-
ous nonpolitical crime outside the United States prior to the arrival of the alien in
the United States; or
(D) there are reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a danger to the secur-
ity of the United States.
8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982).
(e) Voluntary departure
The Attorney General may, in his discretion, permit any alien under deportation
proceedings, other than an alien within the provisions of paragraph (4), (5), (6), (7),
(11), (12), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), or (19) of section 1251(a) of this title (and also
any alien within the purview of such paragraphs if he is also within the provisions of
paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of this section), to depart voluntarily from the
United States at his own expense in lieu of deportation if such alien shall establish
to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that he is, and has been, a person of good
moral character for at least five years immediately preceding his application for vol-
untary departure under this subsection.
8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1982).
106 United States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. at 428.
107 Under federal law, the United States may denaturalize a naturalized citizen if his or
her certificate of naturalization was "illegally procured or... procured by concealment
of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation." Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1982).




"free of Jews" by mid-January of 1942.110 In presenting its case
against Linnas, the Government relied on four video-taped oral
depositions of other Estonians involved with the Nazis to establish
that Linnas was a member of the Selbstschutz and chief of the con-
centration camp at Tartu during 1940-1943."1' These depositions
took place in the Soviet Union prior to Linnas' denaturalization pro-
ceedings. The Government also introduced four documents alleg-
edly signed by Linnas as chief of the Tartu camp 1 2 and evidence
that Linnas served in an Estonian Police Battalion from 1942 to
1944.113
In light of this evidence, the District Court found by "clear, un-
equivocal and convincing evidence" that Linnas had illegally pro-
cured his United States citizenship because he was never lawfully
admitted to the United States. 114 Linnas had entered the United
States in 1951115 under the Displaced Persons Act. 116 The DPA
makes those who "have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil
populations of countries" inadmissible to the United States. 1 7 The
District Court found Linnas inadmissible to the United States, be-
cause he served in the German armed forces as head of the Tartu
concentration camp, and, thus, had persecuted civilians. 1 8 In omit-
ting this from his entrance papers, Linnas had misrepresented his
background in order to be admitted to the United States, and, thus,
had illegally entered under the DPA. 119
The District Court further found that, at the time of his en-
trance into the United States, Linnas lacked the requisite "good
moral character" required under the Immigration and Nationality
Act. 120 His "voluntary involvement in the unjustifiable atrocities
10 Id. at 430-31.
1 1 1 The four individuals deposed were Hans Laats, the supervisor of guards at Tartu,
Olav Karikosk, a concentration camp guard allegedly recruited by Linnas, Oskar Art, a
bus driver who transported prisoners, and Elmer Puusepp, a political prisioner at the
Tartu concentration camp. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. at 431-433.
112 Id. at 434.
1"3 Id. at 435.
114 Id. at 438-9.
115 Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d at 1026.
116 Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948), amended by Pub. L. No. 81-555, 62 Stat.
219 (1950). See supra notes 35-49 and accompanying text.
117 Id. at 1014, § 13.
118 United States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. at 434.
119 Id. at 439. The relevant portion of the DPA, 62 Stat. 1013, provides that: "Any
person who shall willfully make a misrepresentation for the purpose of gaining admis-
sion into the United States as an eligible displaced person shall thereafter not be admis-
sible into the United States."
120 The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3) (1982), provides: "(a)
No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, shall be naturalized unless
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committed against men, women and children" evidenced his poor
moral character. 121 The District Court ultimately revoked Linnas'
citizenship 22 due to the misrepresentations he had made to secure
his naturalization. 123 This decision was upheld upon appeal to the
Second Circuit.
124
Once an individual is denaturalized, he or she is considered an
alien and may go through a separate process for deportation.125 In
the case of individuals suspected of involvement with the Nazis, de-
naturalization inevitably leads to deportation proceedings.' 26 Once
Linnas was stripped of his citizenship, the Government began de-
portation proceedings against him as an immediately deportable
alien under the Holtzman Amendment. 27 An immigration judge
found Linnas deportable.' 2 8 The standard used for deportation is
the same as that used for denaturalization: proof by "clear, une-
quivocal, and convincing evidence."'
29
Under federal immigration law, an individual found deportable
may specify to which country he or she wishes to be deported.' 30 If
that country accepts the individual, he or she is free to depart. Lin-
nas chose the "free and independent Republic of Estonia."' 13 The
Soviet Union had incorporated the independent Republic of Esto-
nia, however, shortly after World War 11.132 Linnas, it seems, meant
to indicate an office building in New York currently used by former
Estonians adverse to the Soviet annexation of the independent Re-
public of Estonia.13 3 The immigration judge, under these circum-
such petitioner ..... (3) during all the period referred to in this subsection has been and
still is a person of good moral character ... "
121 United States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. at 439.
122 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1982).
123 United States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. at 440.
124 United States v. Linnas, 685 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1982).
125 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982 & Supp. 1 1984 & Supp. IV 1986) governs the proceedings
to determine the deportability of an alien. Deportation orders may be appealed through
8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1982).
126 A portion of the Holtzman Amendment, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(19) (1982), specifi-
cally names those involved with the Nazi persecutions as deportable. Thus, denaturali-
zation due to lies about involvement with the Nazis inevitably leads to an individual's
deportation.
127 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(19) (1982); Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d at 1027. Deportation
proceedings are governed by § 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252 (1982 & Supp. 1 1984 & Supp. IV 1986).
128 Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d at 1028.
129 Woodby v. Immigration Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966).
130 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1982).
131 Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d at 1027.
132 Id. See also G. VONRAUGH, THE BALTIC STATES: THE YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE 225-
228 (trans. G. Onn. 1974)(describing incorporation of Estonia).
133 Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d at 1027.
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stances, ordered that Linnas be deported to the "country" of
Estonia, or if the "country" would not accept him, to the Soviet
Union.'
3 4
Linnas appealed the deportation order to the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals ("BIA"). 135 The BIA affirmed the immigration
judge's decision, except as to the country of deportation,1 36 since
the United States has never recognized the Soviet incorporation of
Estonia.1 37 Accordingly, the BIA remanded the decision to the im-
migration judge with orders to specify a statutory basis for such a
designation.13 8 On remand, the immigration judge found Linnas'
deportation to the Soviet Union justified under those subsections of
the Immigration and Nationality Act' 39 which provide for deporta-
tion to the place of the alien's birth or to any country willing to
accept the particular alien.' 40 The BIA affirmed this decision based
on the subsection' 4 ' which provides for deportation to any country
that will accept the alien.'
42
134 Id.
135 Id. The Board of Immigration Appeals is a quasi-judicial body that hears immigra-
tion appeals, including appeals for relief from deportation orders, exclusion of aliens,
petitions to classify the status of alien relatives, and fines imposed for violations of immi-
gration laws. The BIA has nationwide jurisdiction to hear appeals by District directors
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service as well as immigration judges. The
United States Attorney General may modify or overrule decisions of the BIA. The deci-
sions of the BIA are also subject to judicial review in the federal courts. OFFICE OF THE
FEDERAL REGISTER, 1988/89 UNrED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 391-92 (1988).
136 Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d at 1027.
137 The Soviet Union incorporated Estonia in 1940, after an illegal election in which
only Communist candidates were allowed to run for office. G. VON RAUGH, supra note
132, at 225-26. The Estonian parliament met after this election and voted to apply for
membership in the Soviet Union. The Soviets, naturally, accepted the application. Id. at
226-227. The United States, along with Great Britain, refused to recognize as valid the
Soviet incorporation of any of the Baltic States. Id. at 228.
138 Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d at 1027.
139 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(4) & (7) (1982).
140 Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d at 1028. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1982) provides for
deportation:
(1) to the country from which such alien last entered the United States;
(2) to the country in which is located the foreign port at which such alien em-
barked for the United States or for foreign contiguous territory;
(3) to the country in which he was born;
(4) to the country in which the place of his birth is situated at the time he is or-
dered deported;
(5) to any country in which he resided prior to entering the country from which he
entered the United States;
(6) to the country which had sovereignty over the birthplace of the alien at the
time of his birth; or
(7) if deportation to any of the foregoing places or countries is impracticable, in-
advisable, or impossible, then to any country which is willing to accept such alien
into its territory.
141 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(7) (1982).
142 Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d at 1028.
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Linnas sought review of the BIA's decision by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.' 43 First, Linnas argued
that the Holtzman Amendment constituted a Bill of Attainder. 144
Second, Linnas alleged that deporting him to the Soviet Union was,
in fact, extradition in violation of his equal protection1 45 and due
process rights. 146 These rights are applicable to anyone present in
the United States.1 47 The Court found that the Holtzman Amend-
ment did not constitute a Bill of Attainder, because deportation of a
noncitizen from the United States does not constitute punish-
ment. 148 The Second Circuit also found that the deportation of Lin-
143 Id. at 1026-27.
144 Id. at 1028-29. A Bill of Attainder is an act of Congress which "inflict[s] punish-
ment without ajudicial trial." United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946) (quoting
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1866)). The United States Constitu-
tion provides in Article I, Section 9 that "[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall
be passed." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9[3]. When Congress was considering the Holtzman
Amendment, it discussed at length the issue of whether the Amendment constituted a
Bill of Attainder. Congressman Wiggins articulated this concern, stating:
In short, we are legislating retroactively a significant penalty against those identifi-
able persons .... It would seem clear, therefore, that the clause to which I refer
applies to the denial of constitutional liberties, such as employment, as well as to
the imposition of direct criminal penalties. Surely citizenship and a right to remain
in the United States, after that right has been perfected, is a protected liberty of the
highest order.
124 CONG. REC. H31649 (Daily ed. Sept. 26, 1978)(statement of Rep. Wiggins). There
is some support for the notion that denaturalization is punishment. See supra notes 277-
280 and accompanying text.
145 Linnas, 790 F.2d at 1028. Under the Holtzman Amendment, Nazis and individuals
who had contact with the Nazis are singled out for treatment different from that ac-
corded other aliens. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(33) (1982), the United States excludes
Nazis and those involved with the Nazi government of Germany from the United States.
Congress revoked the United States Attorney General's ability to waive exclusion in the
case of those facing persecution in the country of their deportation in Nazi war criminal
cases. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3) (1982). Linnas arguably faced persecution, in the form of a
death sentence, in the Soviet Union. Further, the provisions of the Holtzman Amend-
ment single out those connected with the Nazi government of Germany for different
treatment due to their "political affiliation." Nazis are singled out as a group, therefore
giving rise to equal protection concerns. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,
353 U.S. 252 (1957) (exclusion from the bar due to prior political affiliation with the
Communist Party violated due process).
146 Linnos, 790 F.2d at 1028. The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be
... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
147 See supra notes 181-191 and accompanying text.
148 Linnas, 790 F.2d at 1030. The Court used the analysis of Selective Serv. System v.
Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841 (1984), to describe the criteria
for a Bill of Attainder. The court considered whether the statute (1) is "'within the
historical meaning of legislative punishment;' " (2) has a " 'further nonpunitive legisla-
tive purpose;'" and (3) "'evinces a congressional intent to punish' " considering the
legislative record. Id. at 1029 (quoting Selective Serv., 468 U.S. at 852). The court relied




nas was not, in effect, extradition, because the "impetus for the
denaturalization and removal of Linnas appears to have come from
the government of the United States" rather than that of the Soviet
Union.' 49 Thus, his deportation was not an extradition and there-
fore violated neither his right to due process nor his right to equal
protection. 150
Linnas, who had been held in a New York INS detention center
since February of 1986,15' appealed to the United States Supreme
Court. The Court denied certiorari on December 2, 1986.152
United States Attorney General Edwin Meese became involved with
the case, at the urging of one of President Reagan's aides. 153 On
March 5, 1987, Meese granted Linnas an extra thirty days to find a
country, other than the Soviet Union, willing to accept him.154 Lin-
nas could not do so, and the United States finally deported him. He
arrived in the Soviet Union on April 21, 1987.155 Although Linnas
sought a pardon in the Soviet Union, 156 no new trial was held.157
Linnas died in the Soviet Union onJuly 3, 1987 of heart and kidney
disease.' 58
III. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND THE LINNAS CASE
In Ingraham v. Wright 159 the United States Supreme Court ex-
149 Linnas, 790 F.2d at 1031.
150 Id. at 1031-32.
151 Noble, U.S. Asks Panama to Take Nazi but Is Reected, N.Y. Times, April 16, 1987, at
Al, col. 4.
152 107 S. Ct. 1882 (1987); LI Man Accused of Nazi Atrocities Loses Appeal, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 2, 1986, at B4, col. 3. Justices Brennan, Blackmun and O'Connor voted to grant
certiorari.
153 Meese Hears Plea in Nazi Case, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1987, at A50, col. 3. Patrick
Buchanan, a White House aide, urged Meese to meet with European groups attempting
to stop the Linnas deportation. Id. Buchanan argued that the hunt for Nazis in the
United States had led to "destructive blunders made by our revenge-obsessed Nazi
hunters, inside and outside government, resulting in irreparable injury and death to
innocent Americans." Buchanan, Get It Out in the Open, N.Y. Times, April 7, 1987, at
A34, col. 5 (op ed). Buchanan pointed to the case of Tscherin Soobzokov, accused of
being a Nazi and later found innocent. The allegations against Soobzokov led to his
death during a terrorist bombing of his home in New Jersey. Id.
154 Noble, Meese Gives Nazi Suspect Time to Find a Country, N.Y. Times, March 6, 1987, at
A32, col. 1.
155 Kamm, Estonian Deported by U.S. Arrives in Soviet, N.Y. Times, April 22, 1987, at A12,
col. 1.
156 Estonian Deported by U.S. to Soviet Is Seeking Pardon, N.Y. Times, May 14, 1987, at A8,
col. 4.
157 Prosecution in Soviet Reects New Trialfor War Criminal, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1987, at
A5, col. 5.
158 Keller, Estonian Sent to Face Death in Soviet Dies in a Hospital, N.Y. Times, July 3,
1987, at A2, col. 3.
159 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
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plained that the eighth amendment "was designed to protect those
convicted of crimes."' 160 In Ingraham the Court first considered
whether the paddling of Florida school children constituted cruel
and unusual punishment violative of the eighth amendment.16 The
Court decided that it did not apply, because "[t]he prisoner and the
schoolchild stand in wholly different circumstances, separated by
the harsh facts of criminal conviction and incarceration."' 162 How-
ever, the criminal and Karl Linnas did not necessarily "stand in
wholly different circumstances." Unlike paddled school children,
Linnas stood convicted of crimes in the Soviet Union and was incar-
cerated in the United States.' 63 Under such circumstances, Linnas'
denaturalization and deportation raises eighth amendment issues.
The Soviet Union convicted Linnas for his participation in war
crimes. The United States had no responsibility for his conviction
and played no part in the proceedings. Therefore, the eighth
amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause does not appear
to apply to his case, for there was no action on the part of the United
States with respect to Linnas' conviction and punishment. Yet, the
United States knew of his sentence. The court knew that by deport-
ing Linnas to the Soviet Union, it would be deporting him to his
death.' 64 Under such circumstances, the United States could have
recognized the implications of its decision on the individual in-
volved. Morally, the courts, in effect, closed their eyes to Linnas'
situation. This type of moral blindfold is convenient for cases in-
volving Nazis, but has implications for other cases that may be more
repugnant.
The United States does look to the effects of its actions beyond
its borders in other cases. The Attorney General of the United
States, may, in his discretion, stay deportation if he or she "con-
cludes that deportation to such country would be prejudicial to the
interests of the United States."' 165 More well known, however, is the
political offense exemption. 166 This exemption provides that "[t]he
160 Id. at 664. For criticism of this aspect of the Court's decision, see Comment, Ingra-
ham v. Wright: Corporal Punishment in School Passes Constitutional Tests, 37 MD. L. REV. 594,
603-10 (1978).
161 Ingraham, 438 U.S. at 653.
162 Id. at 669.
163 Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d at 1031-32. See supra text accompanying note 151.
164 Linnas, 790 F.2d at 1030.
165 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1982).
166 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1982). For discussions of the political offense exception,
see Blakesley, The Evisceration of the Political Offense Exception to Extradition," 15 DEN. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 109 (1986); Gilbert, Terrorism and Political Offence Exemption Reappraised,
34 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 695 (1985); Reiss, The Extradition ofJohn Demjanjuk: War Crimes,
Universality Jurisdiction, and the Political Offense Doctrine, 20 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 2811 (1987);
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Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien... to a coun-
try if... the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or
freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion."' 167 In such a case, the Attorney General would
look to the foreign country to determine if an exception was war-
ranted. Congress has spoken through this particular exemption,
and has specifically left alleged Nazi war criminals out of the exemp-
tion.1 68 Perhaps the courts should side with Congress. Yet, it is
doubtful that Congress considered the case of a Soviet death sen-
tence. Further, the eighth amendment implications still remain-
whether or not Congress has spoken.
There is still a further difficulty with the eighth amendment
analysis as applied to Linnas' case. The eighth amendment tradi-
tionally applies solely to United States criminal cases.1 69 In fact, the
Court has held in the past that the amendment does not apply to
deportation.170 Yet, Linnas' deportation and denaturalization had
oddly criminal characteristics. Linnas was denaturalized and de-
ported "because of [his] active participation in the Nazi persecution
of EstonianJews during World War II."171 Thus, it was his involve-
ment in criminal activities that lead to his deportation. Specifically, it
was his misrepresentations about affiliations with the Nazis that re-
sulted in his deportation.17 2 Linnas was deported and faced a death
sentence because of lies on his naturalization and entry forms. En-
tering the United States by means of a "willfully false or misleading
representation or the willful concealment of a material fact" is a mis-
Young & Erny, The Political Offense Exception as Applicable to Terrorists: Judicial Interpretation
and Legislative Reform, 25 DUQ. L. REv. 481 (1987); Comment, The Political Offense Exemp-
tion to Extradition: Protecting the Right of Rebellion in an Era of International Political Violence,
66 OR. L. REv. 405 (1987).
167 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1982).
168 Id. This provision specifically exempts aliens described under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(19), Nazi war criminals, from such consideration.
169 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664-669. See also Calzarano v. Liebowitz, 550 F. Supp. 1389,
1390 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)(eighth amendment applies only to criminal matters); Ryan v.
Cleland, 531 F. Supp. 724, 731-32 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)(eighth amendment applies only to
criminal cases). But see, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S.
1066 (1977)(deliberate indifference to medical needs of prisoners violated cruel and
unusual punishment clause); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)(plurality
opinion) (denaturalization due to army desertion violated eighth amendment cruel and
unusual punishment clause).
170 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). The Court explained that
"deportation is not a punishment for crime." Id. at 730.
171 Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d 1024, 1026 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995




demeanor, 173 and, for a repeat offender, a felony. 174 Yet, under
United States law, "punishment should be proportionate to the
crime. '"175 Indeed, the eighth amendment prohibits "grossly dis-
proportionate punishments."' 17 6 The punishment for the crimes
Linnas participated in under United States law was up to $1,000 fine
and/or two years in prison.' 77 This is not nearly a death
sentence. 1
78
Linnas was also denaturalized and deported in part for his par-
ticipation in murder. This certainly falls within the realm of crimes
meriting the death penalty under United States laws. Yet, Linnas
did not receive a full criminal trial. The United States had not con-
victed him of these crimes under the procedural due process stan-
dards required in a criminal case. Although the Soviet Union tried
him in absentia, this trial did not satisfy United States due process
requirements. 179 Thus, Linnas' case may have been mishandled-
either under the dictates of the eighth amendment or the principles
of due process. If Linnas' death sentence resulted from his partici-
pation in murders, he was not afforded the proper process to obtain
a death sentence.
The courts could avoid this issue by ignoring the foreign death
sentence or by blindly stating that this simply is not a criminal pro-
ceeding, and thus invocation of the eighth amendment is inappro-
priate. Yet, under the characteristics of a criminal proceeding stated
by the Court in Ingraham,1 80 the Linnas case resembles a criminal
proceeding for eighth amendment purposes. Linnas was convicted
and incarcerated. Although the conviction occurred in the Soviet
Union, the eighth amendment implications still exist.
IV. DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS OF THE LINNAS
CASE
Linnas, as a naturalized citizen, had the full rights of United
173 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (Supp. IV 1986). The Code provides for imprisionment for up
to six months or a fine of up to $500, or both.
174 Id. Also, a defendant, "for a subsequent commission of any such offenses shall be
guilty of a felon and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment for not
more than two years, or by a fine of not more than $1,000, or both." Id.
175 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983).
176 Id. at 288.
177 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
178 The Court in Solem v. Helm detailed recent cases in which the death sentence was
not proportionate to the crime. 463 U.S. at 288. Included in this list were: Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (felony murder disproportionate to death penalty); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)(rape disproportionate to death penalty).
179 See supra note 17 and infra notes 231-34 and accompanying text.
180 See supra text accompanying note 162.
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States citizenship. 181 Once denaturalized, like all aliens in the
United States, he still maintained full due process rights. In the Jap-
anese Immigrant Case,18 2 the Supreme Court, in ordering a hearing for
an immigrant who faced deportation because of his alleged illegal
entrance into the United States, specifically granted the right to due
process to people faced with deportation proceedings. 8 3 Due pro-
cess is also a requirement for denaturalization proceedings.
8 4
More recently in Plyler v. Doe, l8 5 the Supreme Court stated that
"[a]liens, even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful,
have long been recognized as persons' guaranteed due process of
law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."' 18 6 In cases of
aliens, such as alleged Nazi war criminals, who are immediately de-
portable,'8 7 the fact that they are deportable does not "negate the
simple fact of [their] presence within the State's territorial perime-
ter."'' 88 Thus, courts must accord even illegal aliens the due process
rights of citizens, for it would be unfair to subject them to United
States law without granting them the protections of those laws.'
8 9
The Plyler Court applied these principles to equal protection.' 90
The Court stated that the concept of equal protection "is fundamen-
tally at odds with the power the State asserts here to classify persons
subject to its laws as nonetheless excepted from its protection."' 19 1
Thus, as first a citizen experiencing denaturalization and second as
an alien experiencing deportation, Linnas had the right to due pro-
cess of law.
A. DEPORTATION AS DISGUISED EXTRADITION
The Second Circuit quickly dismissed Linnas' due process argu-
ments.' 9 2 The court did not consider Linnas' arguments that the
United States had extradited him in the absence of an extradition
181 Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1964). The only rights he did not pos-
sess by naturalization were the rights to run for the presidency and vice presidency. U.S.
CoNsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 4; id. at amend. XII.
182 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
183 Id. at 100. Due process was applied in an exclusion case in Landon v. Plasencia,
459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982).
184 Schneider, 377 U.S. at 165-69.
185 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
186 Id. at 210.
187 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(19) (1982).
188 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 215.
189 Id. at 213.
190 The Supreme Court has stated that "we have clearly held that the Fifth Amend-
ment protects aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful from invidious discrimi-
nation by the Federal Government." Id. at 210.
191 Id. at 213.
192 Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d 1024, 1030-32.
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treaty, stating that it "need not address this novel question, how-
ever, because no extradition has taken place in this case." 19 3 It is
not entirely clear whether or not an extradition took place. Indeed,
this Comment explores forceful arguments that Linnas' deportation
was a de facto extradition. It then further analyzes the what if: If
Linnas' deportation was a de facto extradition, what are the implica-
tions of this situation. Further, this Comment explores the eviden-
tiary problems in these cases in light of the procedural due process
the court afforded Linnas. The nature of the evidence against Lin-
nas and other Nazi war criminals is arguably unreliable.
1. Was Linnas Extradited?
The Second Circuit found arguments of due process grounded
in the lack of an extradition treaty between the United States and
the Soviet Union "ironic," for, as an alleged Nazi, Linnas had af-
forded none of his victims due process.194 The court failed to con-
front the issue of extradition in the absence of a treaty.'9 5 In
support of its decision, the Court explained that the requesting na-
tion must initiate the extradition process. 196 Here, "the impetus for
the denaturalization and removal of Linnas appears to have come
from the government of the United States."' 197 Also, the court
noted that Linnas requested the nation of his deportation, 9 8 so he
had a choice, unlike in an extradition proceeding. In extradition
proceedings, the defendant must return to the nation in which he or
she allegedly committed the crime. Linnas, however, had no real
choice. The Soviet Union was the only country that accepted
him.' 99 Linnas had to go there.
200
The Second Circuit's argument that Linnas did not face extradi-
tion may gloss over the reality of his situation. Had the court de-
ported Linnas while his trial pended in the Soviet Union, the Court
would have sent him to the Soviet Union to stand trial. Sending an
individual to stand trial in another country is illegal in the absence
193 Id. at 1031.
194 Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d at 1031.
195 Id. See supra text accompanying note 193.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1982) provides for such voluntary departure to the nation
of choice.
199 Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d at 1031.
200 The author realizes that this argument logically leads to no deportation of an alien
to a country where that individual has been convicted of a crime in the absence of an




of an extradition treaty.20 1 The court would have had difficulty ig-
noring this situation. Instead, Linnas was not present for his trial in
the Soviet Union. Thus, Linnas had opportunity neither to present
nor to participate in his defense. This situation is not tolerated
under United States' standards of criminal justice and due pro-
cess.202 Yet, ironically, the denaturalization and deportation
processes led him to face the Soviet death sentence without assert-
ing a defense, for it permitted the court to ignore the de facto extra-
dition in his case. Thus, unlike the normal extradition scenario in
which the accused is sent to another country to stand trial, Linnas
did not even have this opportunity, because the Soviets already tried
him in absentia.
Although Linnas' conviction in absentia made it easier for the
court to ignore the de facto extradition, that the Soviets had con-
victed Linnas in absentia should have made no difference in the
court's analysis of his disguised extradition. Extradition is generally
considered applicable to those already convicted in absentia. 20
3
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a situation in which
the foreign nation convicted the individual in absentia as being the
same in effect as an extradition situation, at least where the United
States had an extradition treaty with the other nation. In Antunes v.
Vance,204 the Fourth Circuit found a defendant extraditable when a
French court had already convicted him in absentia for murder and
sentenced him to life imprisonment.205 The fact that Antunes faced
life imprisonment did not enter into the court's opinion.20 6 It con-
sidered probable cause the important aspect of the case.20 7 The
court looked at this deportation which followed convictions in ab-
sentia as an extradition where an extradition treaty existed. The
lack of a pending trial in the Soviet Union should make no differ-
ence to Linnas' case. As a practical matter, Linnas seemed to face
201 The United States denaturalized and deported Feodor Fedorenko, a Nazi war
criminal, to the Soviet Union where he ultimately was tried, convicted and executed.
Barringer, Soviet Reports it Executed Nazi Guard U.S. Extradited, N.Y. Times, July 28, 1987,
at A3, col. 5.
202 See, e.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934), holding that a de-
fendant must be present "whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial,
to the fulness [sic] of his opportunity to defend against the charge." The Court in McK-
aske v. Wiggins interpreted this as meaning that "a defendant has a right to be present at
all important stages of trial." 465 U.S. 168, 178 (1984).
203 See Lubet & Reed, Extradition of Nazis from the United States to Israel: A Survey of Issues
in Transnational Criminal Law, 22 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (1986).
204 640 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1981).
205 Id. at 4.
206 Id. at 4-5.
207 Id. at 5.
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extradition to the Soviet Union. Labelling his situation "denaturali-
zation" or "deportation" does not seem to counteract the final ef-
fect of the court's decision. Thus, this decision arguably constituted
extradition in the absence of an extradition treaty.
The courts did not state whether the Soviet Union ever formally
requested Linnas' extradition prior to the commencement of the
denaturalization and deportation proceedings against him.2 0 8 Yet,
they agreed to take him, acknowledging that they had already con-
victed him there. Should it matter when the Soviet request for "ex-
tradition" came? The Soviets wanted Linnas for crimes, and the
Justice Department knew it. Further, the Soviet Union could not
formally ask for Linnas, for they knew, as well as United States offi-
cials, that no extradition treaty existed between themselves and the
United States. Therefore, the Soviet Union could not expect the
United States to hand Linnas over at their request. Instead, the So-
viet Union waited and offered to take Linnas, so that they could
carry out his death sentence. This amounts to de facto extradition
in the absence of an extradition treaty.20 9
The argument that Linnas was, in actuality, extradited, hinges
on whether the United States is bound to look at the implications of
its deportation decisions. Except in the political offense exemption
to extradition situation, 2 10 the United States generally feels no
208 The Soviet Union has previously requested extradition of Nazi war criminals in the
United States. However, due to the lack of an extradition treaty between the United
States and the Soviet Union, these requests are regularly turned down. Rosenbaum,
Responses to World War Two Criminals and Human Rights Violators: National and Comparative
Perspectives, 8 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 3, 27 (1988)(symposium).
209 18 U.S.C.A. § 3184 (Supp. 1989) provides that:
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United States
and any foreign government, any justice or judge of the United States . . . may,
upon complaint made under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdic-
tion, with having committed within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government
any of the crimes provided for by such treaty or convention, issue his warrant for
the apprehension of the person so charged, that he may be brought before such
justice, judge, or magistrate, to the end that the evidence of criminality may be
heard and considered.... If, on such hearing, he deems the evidence sufficient to
sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty or convention, he shall
certify the same, together with copy of all the testimony taken before him, to the
Secretary of State, that a warrant may issue upon the requisition of the proper au-
thorities of such foreign government, for the surrender of such person, according to
the stipulations of the treaty or convention; and he shall issue his warrant for the
commitment of the person so charged to the proper jail, there to remain until such
surrender shall be made.
Thus, extradition is strictly a creation of treaty. For a discussion of the United States
extradition process, see Lubet & Reed, Extradition of Nazis from the United States to Israel: A
Survey of Issues in Transnational Criminal Law, 22 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 4-9 (1986).
210 See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
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compulsion to look beyond its borders.211 Individuals subject to de-
portation were never legally in the United States. Thus, the United
States' obligation to look at the fate of the individual outside of the
United States is, perhaps, minimal. Yet, when an individual's life is
involved, and the foreign country's process is so contrary to Ameri-
can concepts of due process, there is a desire to look beyond the
borders, and consider the implications of the deportation
decision.21
2
2. The Implications of Extradition
Assuming, contrary to the Second Circuit's determination, that
Linnas' deportation constituted a disguised extradition, the implica-
tions of the "extradition" on the process Linnas was afforded is far
from clear. To begin with, one must examine the nature of extradi-
tion and contrast it with denaturalization and deportation to see
what actual difference this made to the disposition of Linnas' case.
Through extradition, the United States deports an individual to
stand trial in a foreign country which seeks the individual for crimi-
nal acts committed in that state.213 Standards of proof for extradi-
tion are different from those used in American criminal process. In
an extradition proceeding, the court does not determine guilt or in-
nocence.21 4 The court, instead, "determines only whether there is a
sufficient legal basis to warrant the return of the fugitive to the re-
questing country."215 This is a lower standard than "clear, unequiv-
ocal and convincing"2 1 6  required for deportation and
denaturalization. 2 17 The Secretary of State decides ultimately to ex-
tradite an individual.218 The Secretary of State may hand an individ-
ual over to the other country only if: (1) a valid treaty exists; (2) the
individual has been identified as the same person the other nation is
seeking; (3) the charged offenses are considered extraditable
offenses. 21
9
211 It does, however, in the extradition area. See infra notes 248-61 and accompanying
text.
212 This is basically the same argument as is used in the eighth amendment area. See
supra text accompanying note 164.
213 See supra note 18.
214 See Lubet & Reed, supra note 203, at 7.
215 Lubet & Reed, supra note 203, at 6.
216 Schneiderman v. United States, 30 U.S. 18, 125 (1943) (denaturalization);
Woodby v. I.N.S., 385 U.S. 76, 286 (1966)(deportation).
217 Id.
218 18 U.S.C.A. § 3186 (1985). See Lubet & Reed, supra note 203, at 6 (citing United
States v. Schultz (In re Allen), 713 F.2d 105, 108 (5th Cir. 1983); Abu Eain v. Wilkes, 641
F.2d 504, 524 n.26 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981)).
219 Lubet & Reed, supra note 203, at 6.
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Along with these requirements, although the Supreme Court
has never formally declared that extradition requires a probable
cause determination, 220 courts have nevertheless construed extradi-
tion treaties as requiring probable cause where the requirement is
not explicitly stated in the treaty. 22 ' Probable cause requires a de-
termination of the probability of guilt.222 Unlike criminal cases, as
the Supreme Court noted, "[c]ompetent evidence to establish rea-
sonable grounds [for extradition due to criminal conduct] is not
necessarily evidence competent to convict." 223 Instead, "sufficient
evidence of the relator's criminality [must be] presented in the ex-
tradition proceeding before the United States Commissioner.-
224
Even in cases of convictions in absentia in the requesting nation, the
United States may extradite the individual although he was not pres-
ent in that nation to stand trial.
22 5
The existence of an extradition treaty is significant, because
such treaties are ratified with certain assumptions about the process
of the requesting country. Extradition treaties are ratified by a two-
thirds, vote of the Senate and are signed into force by the presi-
dent.226 This shows that the "[e]xecutive has investigated the other
country's criminal procedure and found it adequate.- 227 As Justice
Holmes stated for the majority in Glucksman v. Henkel,228 "[w]e are
bound by the existence of an extradition treaty to assume that the
trial will be fair." 229 As Chief Justice Rehnquist explained while
serving as an assistant attorney general: "extradition treaties are
not negotiated with those countries which do not have either our
form of due process or something we regard as the equivalent of
it."230 Thus, there is an underlying assumption that individuals ex-
tradited in the presence of a treaty will recieve a fair trial, with their
due process rights protected. Yet, it is unclear whether the opposite
is true: the absence of an extradition treaty implies an absence of
220 See In re Extradition of Russell, 805 F.2d 1215, 1217 (5th Cir. 1986).
221 Id.(citing Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 748 (2d Cir. 1980)).
222 Probable cause has been defined as "a reasonable ground for belief of guilt." Car-
roll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925)(quoting McCarthy v. DeArmit, 99 Pa. 63,
69 (1981)). Denaturalization and deportation afford no determination of guilt or inno-
cence. See Lubet & Reed, supra note 203, at 7.
223 Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925).
224 Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1960).
225 Id. See supra notes 203-07 and accompanying text.
226 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
227 Lubet & Reed, supra note 203, at 43.
228 221 U.S. 508 (1911).
229 Id. at 512.
230 Hearings before the Subcomm. on the Genocide Convention on the Ratification of the Interna-
tional Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 149 (1970).
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due process in the other nation. This, however, seems likely in the
case of the Soviet Union, where the legal system differs greatly from
that of the United States.231
The Soviet Union presents particular due process problems in
trying Americans, because its criminal justice system differs greatly
from that of the United States.23 2 For instance, the defendant in a
criminal proceeding in the Soviet Union is confined until the gov-
ernment completes a preliminary investigation. 233 During this time,
the defendant may not see, speak to or write to anyone.23 4 Thus, he
or she cannot begin to prepare a defense.
235
By contrast, in the United States, once the government has
brought a suspect, not yet a defendant, into custody and questioned
him or her, that individual's right to counsel attaches. 23 6 An ac-
cused must be afforded the right to counsel once the "adversary ju-
dicial proceedings have been initiated against him." 237 Once this
process has begun, defendant's counsel must be present during pre-
trial line-ups, 238 preliminary hearing23 9 and questioning, should the
suspect so request.240 By contrast, in the Soviet Union, the accused
is not permitted counsel during the preliminary investigation, which
amounts to a "dress rehearsal" for trial.24 1
Further, there is often substantial pre-trial detention in the So-
viet Union, which can lead to false confessions. 242 Moreover, either
the police, procuracy or KGB interrogate the accused at length prior
to trial, without the aid of counsel. 243 The Soviet system requires
neither an arrest warrant, 244 nor a search warrant. 245 The United
231 See supra note 17 and infra notes 232-46 and accompanying text.
232 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 17, at 62; J. HAZARD, W. BUTLER, & P.
MACGS, THE Sovirr LEGAL SYSTEM: THE LAW IN THE 1980's 55-56 (1984); 0. IOFFE & P.
MAGGS, SOVIET LAw IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, 289-93 (1983).
233 AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, supra note 17, at 156-57.
234 For a description of Soviet trials, see 0. IOFFE & P. MAGGS, supra note 232, at 290-
91.
235 Id. loffee & Maggs note that this is the most critical period for the defendant; yet,
the state involves no one on the defendant's behalf. Id.
236 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966).
237 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972). The adversary judicial proceedings
may begin "by way of a formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or
arraignment." Id. at 689.
238 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-38 (1967).
239 Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 229 (1977).
240 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74.
241 See 0. IOFFE & P. MACGS, supra note 232, at 290-91.
242 See id. at 292. Ioffe and Maggs note also that the courts often try to convict an
individual even if the evidence is faulty to justify the pre-trial detention. Id. at 290.
243 Id. at 290-91. This leads to overwhelming evidence in the state's favor.
244 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 17, at 156.
245 Id. at 203.
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States provides a certain amount of protections in all these areas. 246
Courts in the United States generally do not concern them-
selves with the process used in other countries so long as an extradi-
tion treaty exists. 247 Yet, even if an extradition treaty had existed,
the court still could have found grounds to block Linnas' deporta-
tion. The Second Circuit expressed concern with the criminal pro-
cess in foreign countries even though an extradition treaty existed.
In Gallina v. Fraser,248 the Secretary of State began extradition pro-
ceedings against Gallina to return him to Italy, where an Italian
court had convicted him in absentia.249 The Second Circuit refused
to consider the criminal procedure used in Italy to determine
whether Gallina would receive due process, finding no authority for
such consideration. 250 However, the court questioned the possible
results of such a policy. 25 1 Although it ordered the extradition of
Gallina,252 the court explained its concern: "[n]evertheless, we con-
fess to some disquiet at this result. We can imagine situations where
the relator, upon extradition, would be subjected to procedures or
punishment so antipathetic to a federal court's sense of decency as
to require reexamination of the principle set out above." 253 The
court here expressed the possibility, in spite of the presence of ex-
tradition treaties, that basic procedural requirements which are so
fundamental to the American system could be lost in the extradition
process. It also hinted that it might begin to look at the other coun-
try's process to determine if abuses were likely there, and refuse ex-
tradition on that basis. 2
54
Examining the procedural safeguards actually used in the coun-
try of extradition, the Second Circuit clarified its words in Gallina in
246 In the United States, criminal procedure varies from state to state. Most states
allow a criminal defendant out on bail pending trial unless he or she is found "danger-
ous." See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). Excessive bail is prohibited
under the eighth amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. During incarceration, the gov-
ernment must inform the accused of his or her right to see an attorney prior to and
during interrogations. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 47. Arrest warrants are pre-
ferred, United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 41 (1976), and federal arrests may not occur
without a showing of "reasonable grounds to believe that the arrested person is guilty of
such offense." 18 U.S.C. § 3050 (1982). The accused cannot be forced to testify against
himself under the fifth amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
247 Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960),
reh'g denied, 364 U.S. 906 (1960).
248 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1960).
249 Id. at 78.
250 Id.






United States ex rel. Bloomfield v. Gengler,255 stating that if such proce-
dures "shock[ed] our sense of decency," the court would deny ex-
tradition. 256 In Gengler, the individuals defended themselves at trial
against a charge of conspiracy to export and traffic drugs.
257
Although the Canadian court dismissed the charges against the de-
fendants on procedural grounds at trial, the court later entered con-
victions on appeal in the defendants' absence.258 Thus, while
convicted in absentia, the defendants were not tried in absentia.
259
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided that, because the de-
fendants had the opportunity to defend themselves, their situation
did not shock its "sense of decency." 260 Reaching this conclusion,
the court explained that the "inability to assert a defense might be
one of those instances" that warrant a blocking of extradition due to
a conviction in absentia. 2
6'
Linnas, as any other individual convicted in absentia and sub-
ject to denaturalization, was unable to assert any defense in the So-
viet Union to the charges of his war crimes. Further, war crimes are
considered "political" offenses in the Soviet Union.262 Political
cases are run by the KGB, 263 who regularly falsify evidence in such
cases. 264 Under the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Gallina and
Gengler, Linnas' case would be "antipathetic" to the court's sense of
decency, for he was deprived of his life without the opportunity to
assert a proper defense. Failing to recognize this, the Second Cir-
cuit, instead, decided Gallina was inapplicable to Linnas' case, 265
stating that his appeal to the court's sense of "decency" and "com-
passion" rang "hollow" in light of his own actions during World
War 11.266 The court made no further attempt to explain its argu-
ment, but simply dismissed the due process claim. Yet, under the
reasoning of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Gallina and
Gengler, even if an extradition treaty had existed between the Soviet
255 507 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1974).
256 Id. at 928.
257 Id. at 926.
258 Id.
259 Id. at 929.
260 Id. at 928.
261 Id.
262 United States v. Kungys, 571 F. Supp. 1104, 1124 (D.N.J. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 793 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 108 S. Ct. 1537 (1988).
263 0. IOFFE & P. MAGGS, supra note 232, at 292.
264 Id at 289, 292.
265 Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d 1024, 1032 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting Gallina v. Fraser, 278




Union and the United States, there is a possibility that the United
States should not have deported Linnas.
Yet, the lack of an extradition treaty lends strength to Linnas'
case. Because no extradition treaty exists between the United States
and the Soviet Union, his deportation would violate United States
law, which requires an extradition treaty.267 By implication, it may
also violate his due process rights, if the reason for the lack of an
extradition treaty between the two countries is due to a lack of due
process in the Soviet Union.268 Linnas argued that he had a due
process right guaranteeing that he would not be extradited in the
absence of such a treaty.269 In reality, extradition affords the de-
fendant a probable cause determination.2 70 This allows the court to
determine the probability of guilt. 27 1 Instead, in denaturalization
and deportation the government had to show by "clear, unequivocal
and convincing evidence" that his citizenship was illegally procured.
There is a certain amount of irony in Linnas' position.
Although Linnas argued that an extradition treaty would be neces-
sary for the United States to send him to face a Soviet death sen-
tence, extradition would have afforded him less procedural
safeguards than the actual deportation and denaturalization process
he underwent. Extradition, like deportation and denaturalization, is
not a criminal proceeding.272 Neither the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure273 nor the Federal Rules of Evidence 274 apply. The re-
sult is that "extradition hearings are lavish in their use of hearsay,
and often tolerant of documents of questionable authenticity.- 275
Further in denaturalization proceedings, the courts have recog-
267 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1982).
268 See supra notes 227-30, 232-46 and accompanying text.
269 Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d at 1031. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals found
this possibility unpersuasive in their opinion, stating:
Noble words such as "decency" and "compassion" ring hollow when spoken by a
man who ordered the extermination of innocent men, women and children kneeling
at the edge of a mass grave. Karl Linnas' appeal to humanity, a humanity which he
has grossly, callously and monstrously offended, truly offends this court's sense of
decency.
Id. at 1032.
270 In re Extradition of Russell, 805 F.2d 1215, 1217 (5th Cir. 1986).
271 The amount of evidence necessary to extradite is not specified by United States
statute. Rather, all United States extradition treaties contain a section specifying the
amount of evidence required. See Rosoff, The Quantum of Evidence Required to Extradite from
the United States, in TRANSNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 123 (1983).
272 See, e.g., Romeo v. Roache, 820 F.d 540, 543-44 (1st Cir. 987); United States v.
Galanis, 429 F. Supp. 1215, 1224 (D. Conn. 1977).
273 FED. R. CRIM. P. 54(b)(5).
274 FED. R. EVID I101(d)(3).




nized the importance of the citizenship right at stake. First, denatu-
ralization imposes heavy consequences upon the ex-citizen. Indeed,
"[d]enaturalization consequences may be more grave than conse-
quences that flow from conviction for crimes." 276 Second, the
courts consider American citizenship a "precious right" 277 and,
thus, "naturalization decrees are not lightly to be set aside." 278 In-
deed, the Supreme Court has gone so far as to say in the expatria-
tion case of a United States military deserter "[w]e believe.., that
use of denationalization as a punishment is barred by the Eighth
Amendment. There may be involved no physical mistreatment, no
primitive torture. There is instead the total destruction of the indi-
vidual's status in organized society.
'279
Due to these characteristics of citizenship, the Supreme Court
has held that the "[g]overnment carries a heavy burden of proof in a
proceeding to divest a naturalized citizen of his citizenship.' ",280
The burden of proof in denaturalization cases is a showing of
"[c]lear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence which does not leave
issues in doubt." 281 Justice Black described the Government's bur-
den as "substantially identical with that required in criminal cases-
proof beyond a reasonable doubt." 28 2 In addition to this, the Court
will not revoke citizenship without the individual there to present
his or her case, just as it will not convict a person of a crime on
default.2 83 These are heavier safeguards than are afforded individu-
als in extradition proceedings.
Currently there is some controversy regarding whether an indi-
vidual, such as Linnas, would have any rights under a treaty if an
extradition treaty existed. 28 4 According to the court in United
276 Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 611 (1949)(Black, J.), modified, 335 U.S.
631 (1949). Justice Black announced the judgment of the Court. There was no majority
opinion.
277 Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 269 (1961).
278 Id. (quoting Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353).
279 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). This case dealt with a
court martial that penalized a deserter with denationalization. The Court, however, has
consistently held that the eighth amendment does not apply to civil matters, but only to
criminal matters. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977). But see supra notes 162-
79 and accompanying text. For the text of the eighth amendment, see supra note 7.
280 Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 505 (1981)(quoting Costello, 365 U.S. at
269).
281 Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125, (1943), reh. denied, 320 U.S. 807
(1943). See also Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353 (1960)(invoking clear, une-
quivocal, and convincing standard); Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 670
(1944)("proof to bring about a loss of citizenship must be clear and unequivocal.").
282 Klapprott, 335 U.S. at 612 (Black, J., judgment of the court).
283 Id. at 611 (Black, J., judgment of the court).
284 See Kester, supra note 275, at 1465-68.
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States v. Vreeken, 28 5 a "defendant can successfully challenge the
court's jurisdiction over his person if he is before the court in viola-
tion of an international treaty." 28 6 In Linnas' case, it is the lack of a
treaty, he argued, that violated his rights. Thus, he used a statutory
argument-that, by statute, the United States may only extradite in
the presence of an extradition treaty.
B. PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE
Several commentators have explored the problems of evidence
in Nazi war criminal cases. 287 Rather than restating their arguments
in their entirety, this section will provide a brief synopsis of the
problems examined by these commentators as well as contemplate
additional difficulties raised by Nazi cases. The problems of evi-
dence in Nazi cases falls into three main categories: (1) suggestive
identifications; (2) stale evidence; and (3) unreliable Soviet-source
evidence.
1. Suggestive Identifications and Stale Evidence
The Supreme Court has recognized that eyewitness identifica-
tions are inherently suggestive. 28 8 Indeed, the Court in United States
v. Wade289 stated that "[t]he vagaries of eyewitness identification are
well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mis-
taken identification. 290 The Court explained that the manner in
which the prosecution presents a defendant to witnesses for pretrial
identification was "[a] major factor contributing to the high inci-
dence of miscarriage of justice." 29
Eyewitness identifications are conducted in person or by photo-
graph.292 In Linnas' case, the government used photographs. 293 A
witness can be influenced by those conducting the photographic dis-
285 603 F. Supp. 715 (D. Utah 1984).
286 Id. at 717 (citing Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1927); United States v.
Rauscher, 109 U.S. 407 (1886); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 983 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975)).
287 See generally Nesselson & Lubet, supra note 22; Note, Denaturalization of Suspected Nazi
War Ciminals: The Problem of Soviet-Source Evidence, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 365
(1986).
288 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 234-35 (1967).
289 Id.
290 Id. at 228.
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 United States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. at 431. Four witnesses, whom the United




play, and, thereby pick out the wrong individual. 294 The United
States conducted the Linnas identifications in the Soviet Union dur-
ing a deposition by United States officials. 295 The United States
Government showed three of the deponents a photographic spread
of eight pictures. 296 The witnesses were elderly and were attempt-
ing to remember distant events. Their testimony was, therefore, of
questionable reliability. Under these circumstances, the validity of
the identification procedures used in Linnas' case merit further
examination. 2
97
The District Court in United States v. Fedorenko,298 considered the
case of a photographic display followed by an in-court identification
of an alleged Nazi war criminal. 299 The court explained that "[i]n
view of the passage of 35 years from the date of the incidents, the
court must scrutinize these identifications and the circumstances
under which they were made with great care." 300 The court ex-
plained that the civil nature of the case made no difference, stating
that "the concerns of the Supreme Court regarding the reliability
and probative value of identifications made in criminal cases are no
less applicable here. '
30 1
In criminal cases, the courts consider five factors in deciding on
the reliability of identifications.30 2 These factors include:
the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the
crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior de-
294 Lubet & Reed, note 203, at 12. The individual conducting the photographic dis-
play can point, nod or make facial expressions, suggesting which photograph is correct.
The district court in Linnas' case was admittedly disturbed by the identifications. The
court explained:
The court however is disturbed by language used by the Soviet prosecutor when
introducing members of the Department of Justice to deponents Oskar Art, Olav
Karikosk, and Hans Laats. In each instance the Soviet official referred to the instant
matter as an action by the United States against the former war criminal, Karl Lin-
nas. The case was variously described as concerning: the "Fascist prisoner mur-
der[er], Karl Linnas," and "Karl Linnas, a former war criminal."
United States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. 426, 434 n.16 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
295 Id. at 431.
296 Id.
297 See Nesselson & Lubet, supra note 22, at 74. Nesselson and Lubet note that "[t]he
rub, of course, is proof. Except in those rare cases where photographs or other admissi-
ble documentation might be available, the evidence will almost inevitably come by way
of eyewitness testimony." Id.
298 455 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Fla. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir.
1979), aff'd, 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
299 Id. at 905.
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977)(citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S.
188, 199-200 (1972)). The district court in Linnas' case was "guided" by these stan-
dards. United States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. 426, 432 n.II (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
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scription of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the
confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation.
Against these factors is to be weighed the corrupting effect of the sug-
gestive identification itself.
30 3
The fifth factor enunciated by the Court-the time between the
crime and the confrontation-is the major factor weighing against
the admissibility of witnesses' depositions in Nazi war criminal
cases. 30 4 With the passage of thirty-five years or more, the reliability
of witnesses' testimony is questionable. The Court has emphasized
the time element in past decisions.
30 5
The crimes Linnas allegedly committed occurred sometime be-
tween 1940 and 1944.306 Linnas entered the United States in 1951,
and the denaturalization proceedings against him began in 1979.307
His trial in the Soviet Union occurred in 1962.308 The evidence in
his case, therefore, was at least 35 years old at his denaturalization
proceeding and 18 years old when he was tried in the Soviet Union.
The United States government relied on eyewitness testimony in his
case.30 9 The problem with eyewitness testimony in such a case is
that it is sometimes as much as forty years old and witnesses are at
least in their sixties when testifying.3 10 Memory problems associ-
ated with these witnesses' advanced age render such testimony and
identification questionable. Therefore, eyewitness identifications in
Nazi war crimes cases are rife with problems, 31' and are of question-
able reliability. Such reliability problems may conflict with due
process.
2. Soviet-Source Evidence
The evidence used in Linnas' case from the Soviet Union is of
303 Manson, 432 U.S. at 114.
304 Nesselson & Lubet, supra note 22, at 89-91.
305 See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 385 (1968)(witnesses shown pic-
tures "only a day later, while their memories were still fresh"); Manson, 432 U.S. at 116
(photographic display two days after the crime).
306 Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d at 1027. The United States introduced evidence show-
ing that Linnas signed some correspondence as head of the concentration camp at Tartu
and had been wounded in battle on August 30, 1944.
307 Id. at 1026.
308 McFadden, Court Approves Expulsion Order for an L.L Man, N.Y. Times, May 9, 1986,
at B3, col. 1.
309 The United States had papers allegedly signed by Linnas as head of the Tartu
camp that were provided by the Soviet Union and were admitted into evidence. See
Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d at 1027.
310 Nesselson and Lubet, supra note 22, at 75. Nesselson and Lubet explained that
fundamental fairness requires that a "defendant in a denaturalization case be allowed to
challenge the admissibility of an identification that would not be acceptable in a criminal
trial." Id. at 79-80.
311 Lubet & Reed, supra note 203, at 11.
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questionable reliability, because the KGB has a history of falsifying
evidence in political cases, 312 whether it be by threatening witnesses
prior to depositions, 31 3 or falsifying other materials to prove the
case against the defendant.3 14 As two commentators noted:
"[o]bservers of political trials complain repeatedly that witnesses
are compelled to lie by the KGB, that documentary testimony is fal-
sified, and that courts accept such evidence uncritically out of defer-
ence to the KGB."
3 15
A recent student note focused on the due process problems of
Soviet-source evidence.31 6 In this Note, the author described recent
cases in which the validity of Soviet-source evidence was considered
by the courts.31 7 The author examined three cases that found So-
viet-source evidence problematic318 and three cases that assessed it
favorably.31 9 Noting that the Soviet Union picks the witnesses,
3 20
the author explained that "the defendants have no opportunity to
examine records in Soviet archives or to locate witnesses in Soviet-
controlled territory who may have knowledge of exculpatory
facts."'3 21 The author concluded that changes must be made in the
Moscow Agreement, 322 the Soviet-United States agreement con-
cerning the ability of the United States to obtain Soviet-source
evidence.3 2
3
Among the cases discussed that assessed Soviet evidence nega-
tively in the student note were United States v. Kungys, 324 Laipenieks v.
312 United States v. Kungys, 571 F. Supp. 1104, 1125-26 (D.N.J. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 793 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 108 S. Ct. 1537 (1988).
313 See 0. IOFFE & P. MAGGS, supra note 232, at 292.
314 Id.
315 Id.
316 Note, supra note 287.
317 Id. at 378-92. The author examined three cases in which Soviet-source evidence
was questioned, id. at 378-85, and and three cases, including United States v. Linnas,
527 F. Supp. 426 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), in which the Soviet evidence was found valid. Id. at
387-92.
318 Note, supra note 287, at 378-85.
319 I at 387-92.
320 There are conflicting reports on this aspect of obtaining Soviet evidence. Another
student commentator stated that the "OSI also points to the fact that the witnesses are
requested specifically by the American government; the Soviets do not merely supply
the witnesses for investigation." Comment, Finishing the Work of Nuremberg? Nazi War
Criminals and American Law, 20 CONN. L. REV. 633, 652 (1988)(citing A. RYAN, QUIET
NEIGHBORS: PROSECUTING NAZI WAR CRIMINALS IN AMERICA 92 (1984)).
321 Note, supra note 287, at 375.
322 The Moscow Agreement is not formally published. See A. RYAN, QUIET NEIGH-
BORS: PROSECUTING NAZI WAR CRIMINALS IN AMERICA 91-93 (1984).
323 Note, supra note 287, at 392.
324 57 F. Supp. 1104 (D.N.J. 1983), rev's on other grounds, 793 F.d 516 (3d Cir. 1986),
rev'd on other grounds, 108 S. Ct. 1537 (1988).
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LN.S.325 and United States v. Kowalchuk.326 In Laipenieks, the court
was concerned about deposition evidence because during the depo-
sitions in the Soviet Union, "the Soviet Procurator, in the presence
of the witnesses, continually referred to the matter as the 'war crimi-
nal case' or the 'Nazi criminal Laipenieks case.' The IJ found that
the prejudicial and highly suggestive language used by the Soviet
official tainted the deposition proceedings.- 327 The court in
Kowalchuk viewed the testimony of Soviet witnesses with "skeptism,"
stating, "the fact remains that these witnesses were all selected and
made available by the Soviet government and were under its con-
trol; they could scarcely be expected to testify except in support of
the chanrges originally aired by the Soviet government for its own
reasons."
328
Perhaps the most striking of the cases was United States v.
Kungys, 329 in which a NewJersey district court confronted a situation
similar to that of Linnas. The government in Kungys relied on So-
viet-supplied depositions Lo denaturalize a Lithuanian who allegedly
committed war crimes. The court in Kungys noted that the Soviets
had a strong interest in war criminal cases and, thus, the courts
should examine with particular care any finding reached by the aid
of Soviet authorities. 330 In doing so, the court recognized that the
KGB prepared the witnesses prior to their depositions by United
States authorities. 331 The court questioned the validity of these
depositions 332 and decided that the depositions were inadmissible
for the purpose of proving that Kungys had participated in the kill-
ings.3 33 Thus, this court recognized the reliability problems associ-
ated with Soviet-supplied evidence. 334 The United States' case
3 35
325 750 F.d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985).
326 773 F.d 488 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, Kowalchuk v. United States, 475 U.S. 1132
(1986).
327 Laipenieks, 750 F.2d at 1432.
328 Kowalchuk, 571 F. Supp. at 79-80.
329 571 F. Supp. 1104 (D.N.J. 1983), rev'don other grounds, 793 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1986),
rev'd on other grounds, 108 S. Ct. 1537 (1988). The Third Circuit found that Kungys had
lied about the place and date of his birth on his entrance and naturalization forms. They
found this material in that had he answered truthfully, the state would have had cause to
investigate his background and "probably" would have denied his visa. 793 F.2d at 530.
330 Kungys, 571 F. Supp. at 1124.
331 Id. at 1126.
332 Id. at 1126-1131. The court stated, "[wie also are faced with the fact that the
Soviet Union uses special procedures in political cases such as this which, on occasion at
least, result in false or distorted evidence in order to achieve the result which the state
interest requires." Id. at 1126.
333 Id. at 1132. The court entered judgment for the defendant, and barred his denat-
uralization. Id. at 1144.
334 Other courts that have recognized the problems inherent in Soviet-source evi-
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against Linnas rested on evidence also obtained from the Soviet
Union. With the potential reliability problems involved with the use
of Soviet evidence, it may be time to find another solution.
III. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
The United States has been criticized for both its failure to res-
cue Jews during World War II as well as its lax immigration policies
which allowed many Nazi conspirators to enter the United States.
33 6
There is, however, an alternate view that the world should "forget
the Holocaust and get on with life."'337 However, "forgetting an oc-
currence before fully realizing its moral implications and adequately
dealing with them is morally irresponsible. ' 3 3 8 In light of such
moral implications and the due process and eighth amendment
problems that arise in the process of denaturalizing and deporting
alleged Nazi war criminals, it is inadvisable to end discussion of the
Linnas case without suggesting a possible solution. The United
States could take responsibility for its acquiescence to the presence
of war criminals within its borders by bringing these criminals to
trial within its own territory.33 9 The United States normally would
not have jurisdiction over these criminals. Under the sixth amend-
ment,3 40 the United States can only try individuals for crimes occur-
ring within its borders. However, under international law, the
United States may exercise jurisdiction over alleged war
criminals.3 4
1
The United States may exercise jurisdiction over alleged Nazi
war criminals based on principles of universal jurisdiction.3 42 Ac-
dence include: Laipenieks v. I.N.S., 750 F.2d 1427, 1433 (9th Cir. 1985); United States
v. Kowalchuk, 571 F. Supp. 72, 78-80 (E.D. Pa. 1983), order to revoke citizenship rev'd, 744
F.2d 301 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'den banc, 773 F.2d 488 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1012
(1986). See also Note, supra note 287, at 386-87 (discussing cases in which court nega-
tively assessed Soviet-source evidence).
335 This evidence included depositions by United States officials in the Soviet Union
as well as documents provided by the Soviet government. United States v. Linnas, 527
F. Supp. at 431-434.
336 Massey, Individual Responsibility for Assisting the Nazis in Persecuting Civilians, 71 MINN.
L. REv. 97 (1986).
337 Id. at 151.
338 Id.
339 Id. at 156. As this commentator stated: "Because the United States enabled Nazi
collaborators to escape formal judgment for their acts, and extradition is often imper-
missible, a second solution is for the United States itself to render judgment."
340 The sixth amendment provides for trial "by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
341 The law of the United States includes international law. The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677, 712 (1900).
342 See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985).
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cording to the Restatement of the Law of Foreign Relations Law of
the United States, 343 "[a] state may exercise jurisdiction to define
and punish for certain offenses recognized by the community of na-
tions as .. .genocide [and] war crimes .. .even where none of the
bases of jurisdiction indicated in § 402344 is present. '3 4 5 If a state
has jurisdiction to prescribe, it has jurisdiction to enforce. 346 Under
this rule, the United States may exercise jurisdiction over alleged
Nazi war criminals residing in the United States. The community of
nations has recognized Nazi atrocities as war crimes and crimes
against humanity.347 Thus, under principles of international law,
the United States has the ability to exercise jurisdiction over alleged
Nazi war criminals.
Canada has recently decided to amend its criminal code to al-
low for the prosecution in Canadian courts of people charged with
Nazi war crimes. 348 Further, a United States Court of Appeals ap-
plied these principles of international law in the case of Demjanjuk v.
Petrovsky.349 Israel alleged that Demjanjuk was "Ivan the Terrible,"
a guard at the Nazi concentration camp at Treblinka, Poland in
1942.350 In this case, Israel asked the United States to extradite
343 RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(tentative draft no. 6, vol. 1) (1985). The Court in Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky gave considera-
ble weight to the Restatement. 776 F.2d at 582-83. The Supreme Court recently recog-
nized the relevance of the seventh tentative draft in resolving questions of international
law in Societe Nationale v. United States Dist. Court, Dist. Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 107 S. Ct.
2542, 2555, n.28 (1987).
344 RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(tentative draft no. 6, vol. 1)(1985). § 402(1) provides in part: "a state has jurisdiction
to prescribe law with respect to ... (1)(b) the status of persons, or interests in things,
present within its territory; (c) conduct outside its territory which has or is intended to
have substantial effect within its territory." The most recent version of the Restatement,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 402
(1987), uses essentially identical language.
345 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 404 (1987) (footnote added).
346 Id. at § 431(1).
347 The United Nations has made several resolutions in this particular area. One of
them states that "[elvery State has the right to try its own nationals for war crimes or
crimes against humanity." Principles of International Co-Operation in the Detection,
Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity, General Assembly Resolution 3074 (XXVIII) Dec. 3, 1973. The U.N.
considers Nazi atrocities as both war crimes and crimes against humanity. See, e.g., 41
A.J.I.L. 172 (1947).
348 Burns, Canada to Try Nazi Suspects, N.Y. Times, March 13, 1987, at Al, col. I. Can-
ada currently has twenty cases considered urgent and two hundred people under investi-
gation of potential Nazi war criminals. Id.
349 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985).
350 Id. at 575.
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Demjanjuk to Israel to stand trial.351 The Sixth Circuit ordered the
extradition, recognizing "that some crimes are so universally con-
demned that the perpetrators are the enemies of all people. There-
fore, any nation which has custody of the perpetrators may punish
them according to its law applicable to such offenses." 352 Thus, the
court held that the fact that Demjanjuk allegedly committed the
crimes in Poland did not "deprive Israel of authority to bring him to
trial." 35
3
A specific treaty also exists that gives the United States the abil-
ity to prosecute war criminals. In 1986, the United States Senate
ratified the Genocide Convention. 354 A creation of the United Na-
tions, the Genocide Convention confirmed that genocide was a
crime under international law.355 The Convention provided for the
punishment of "[p]ersons committing genocide" and other related
crimes. 356 The parties agreeing to the Convention:
undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective constitutions,
the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present
Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for per-
sons guilty of genocide or of any of the other acts enumerated in arti-
cle II1.357
Thus, as a party to this Convention, the United States is under a
treaty obligation to "provide effective penalties" for those commit-
ting genocide, which would include Nazi war criminals. While one
could argue that the Holtzman Amendment has effectively done
this, the problems that arise under the due process clause and
eighth amendment call for another solution.
358
Further, the Convention calls for "effective penalties.1 359 The
Holtzman Amendment would not work as an effective penalty if the
United States sent Linnas, as then Attorney General Meese tried to
351 Id. An extradition treaty exists between Israel and the United States. Convention
on Extradition, Dec. 10, 1962, United States-Israel, 14 U.S.T. 1707, T.I.A.S. No. 5476.
352 Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 582.
353 Id.
354 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, approved by the Senate, S.Res. 347, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess., 132 Cong. Rec. S12297 (1986) [hereinafter "Genocide Convention"].
355 Id. at art. I, 280.
356 Id. at art. IV, 280. The crimes enumerated included: "(a) Genocide; (b) Conspir-
acy to commit genocide; (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; (d) At-
tempt to commit genocide; (e) Complicity in genocide." Id. at art. III, 280.
357 Id. at art. V, 280.
358 See also infra notes 359-60 and accompanying text (questioning effectiveness of
Holtzman Amendment).
359 78 U.N.T.S. at art. V, 280.
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do, to Panama.3 60 Linnas faced no prosecution in Panama. In ef-
fect, he would have escaped all penalties for his war crimes. Thus,
by trying him in the United States, the Government would be as-
sured that he was brought to justice, in keeping with the Genocide
Convention.
There remains one difficulty in invoking the Genocide Conven-
tion as a means to bringing alleged Nazi war criminals to justice in
the United States. The Genocide Convention contains a jurisdic-
tional provision, stating:
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in
article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the
territory of which the act was committed, or by such international pe-
nal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting
Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.
3 61
Under the second provision, no international tribunal currently ex-
ists to try alleged Nazi war criminals. Under the first portion of the
jurisdictional provision, the United States would not seem to have
jurisdiction, because the crimes did not take place in the United
States. Yet, this has not prevented other parties to the Convention
from considering themselves competent tribunals to hear these
cases.
Like Israel and Canada, the United States should claim jurisdic-
tion over alleged Nazi war criminals. At a minimum, legislators
should make this provision for those, like Linnas, who face de facto
extradition in the absence of an extradition treaty or who would face
no penalty in the country of their deportation. In this way, individu-
als like Linnas would be assured of adequate due process, yet the
accused would not escape justice, as those who are currently de-
ported to non-hostile nations under the Holtzman Amendment.
3 62
There still remains one problem in trying alleged Nazi war
criminals in the United States. Even if Congress enacted a statute
allowing for prosecution of Nazi war criminals in the United States,
it is possible that the government could not bring such cases due to
the ex post facto clause of the Constitution. 363 In enacting, for in-
stance, a new statute governing Nazi prosecutions in the United
States, Congress would criminalize conduct that occurred outside of
360 Attorney General Edwin Meese tried to find another country for Linnas. Noble,
U.S. Asks Panama to Take Nazi But is Rjected, N.Y. Times, April 16, 1987, at Al, col. 4.
361 Genocide Convention, supra note 354, at art. VI, 280-82.
362 For example, in Kulle v. I.N.S., 825 F.2d 1188 (7th Cir. 1987), the court upheld
the deportation of a member of the Waffen SS to the Federal Republic of Germany. See
supra note 360.




the United States. War criminals, arguably, came to the United
States knowing that the United States government could not try
them in light of the sixth amendment requirement that individuals
be tried at the site of their crimes. A statute that provided for trials
in the United States for crimes committed outside of its borders
would, thus, cause ex post facto problems.
The United States Supreme Court in Weaver v. Graham364 ex-
plored the ex post facto prohibition. At first glance, the Court's de-
cision seems to work against the trial of alleged Nazis in the United
States. The Court set out two requirements for a criminal or penal
law to be ex post facto: "it must be retrospective, that is, it must
apply to events occurring before its enactment, and it must disad-
vantage the offender affected by it."65 A new law covering Nazi
prosecutions looks retrospective, for currently there is no law that
applies penal sanctions to Nazis. Yet, the United States has always
criminalized murder. Further, the Court based these requirements
on the purpose behind the ex post facto provision. The Court
stated that "[t]hrough this prohibition, the Framers sought to assure
that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit indi-
viduals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed."3 66 Thus,
notice seems to be key to the intent behind ex post facto laws.
The Court described the importance of notice in ex post facto
analysis in Dobbert v. Florida.3 67 In Dobbert, the Court considered a
murder case in which a valid death penalty statute did not exist at
the time of the murders. 368 The Court stated, "[h]ere the existence
of the statute served as an 'operative fact' to warn the petitioner of
the penalty which Florida would seek to impose on him if he were
convicted of first-degree murder. This was sufficient compliance
with the ex post facto provision of the United States Constitution.
' 369
There are many possible "operative facts" that could serve as notice
to alleged Nazis such as Linnas, including the criminalization of
murder in the United States and the Genocide Convention.
Under international law, the United States recognizes Nazi
atrocities as crimes. Indeed, the United States' participation in the
364 450 U.S. 24 (1981).
365 Id. at 29 (footnotes omitted).
366 Id. at 28-29 (citations omitted).
367 432 U.S. 282 (1977).
368 Id. at 297. The murders occurred prior to the Court's decision in Furman v. Geor-
gia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), in which the Court found the death penalty unconstitutional.
After the Court overturned this decision, Dobbert was tried under a new Florida death
penalty statute that went into effect after his crimes. Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 297.
369 Dobbert, 432 U.S at 298.
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Nuremberg Trials evidences this.3 70 The Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Demanjuk v. Petrovsky3 7 1 considered a similar issue in decid-
ing whether an Israeli court would be competent to try Demjanjuk.
The court stated that "Demjanjuk had notice before he applied for
residence or citizenship in the United States that this country, by
participating in post-war trials of German and Japanese war
criminals, recognized the universality principle." 372 Linnas, enter-
ing the United States the year before Demjanjuk,373 was also on no-
tice that the United States recognized his conduct as criminal and
could claim jurisdiction over him.
374
Crimes such as those committed by the Nazis cannot be dis-
missed as offenses against only a particular nation. Indeed, the
Sixth Circuit in Demjanjuk stated, "the underlying assumption is that
the crimes are offenses against the law of nations or against human-
ity and that the prosecuting nation is acting for all nations."3 75 Lin-
nas' case is even stronger, because the nation where he allegedly
committed his offenses no longer politically exists. 376 It was there-
fore, in a political sense, impossible to send him to the nation where
his crimes were perpetrated to stand trial under its laws. Thus, the
United States, as Israel and Canada have already, could begin to act
for all nations, and assume the responsibility of trying these individ-
uals for whom it has provided a haven since the end of World War
II.
IV. CONCLUSION
In enacting the Holtzman Amendment,3 77 Congress sought to
fill a gap in United States immigration and naturalization law. With
this Amendment, Congress provided for the removal of Nazi war
370 At Nuremberg, the United States even prosecuted individuals whose crimes were
committed prior to the United States' involvement in World War II. The Municipal and
International Law Basis ofJurisdiction over War Crimes, BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 382, 391 (1951).
371 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985).
372 Id. at 583.
373 Demjanjuk entered the United States in 1952. Id. at 575. Linnnas entered the
United States in 1951. Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d at 1026.
374 The London Agreement, which chartered the International Military Tribunal, was
signed on August 8, 1945. Agreement by the Government of the United States of
America, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major
War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 1546, E.A.S. No. 472,
82 U.N.T.S. 279.
375 Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 583.
376 The Soviet Union incorporated Estonia in 1940. See VON RAUGH, supra note 132,
at 226-27.
377 See supra note 105 for the text of the Holtzman Amendment.
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criminals residing in the United States. Though an admirable effort,
the "solution" may violate the due process and eighth amendment
rights of these alleged criminals. By trying individuals such as Lin-
nas in the United States, the courts can protect such persons' consti-
tutional rights. In addition, it can insure that these people will face
their accusers and be brought to justice. As it stands, the current
deportation and denaturalization processes merely act as a means to
circumvent eighth amendment and due process rights accorded
these individuals by virtue of their presence in the United States. It
is up to either the courts to find the Holtzman Amendment uncon-
stitutional or Congress to change the amendment, at least in cases
such as that of Linnas. Congress, then, could grant jurisdiction to
United States courts to make certain that the United States will
bring these alleged Nazi war criminals to justice.
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